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“The global nature of the Internet and the jurisdictional limitations on the 
practice of law following geographical boundaries raise troubling issues for 
lawyers of regulatory compliance, jurisdiction and choice of law.”2
Abstract 
The Internet is becoming the primary manner in which some attorneys serve clients.  
States have already taken differing views on whether it is acceptable for an attorney to engage in 
electronic representations of clients.  Thus, determining what jurisdiction’s law applies to such 
attorney conduct can be very important in deciding whether this activity constitutes the 
unauthorized practice of law, and, if not, the exact duties of an attorney in such representations.     
 
This article argues that the current version of Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 
8.5(b), which governs choice of ethics law, can be interpreted to apply the legal ethics rules of the 
state in which the attorney is located to all electronic representations.  However, the dormant 
commerce clause prohibits a state from regulating activity that does not occur or have a 
significant effect in its physical boundaries.   It is not clear that the state in which the lawyer is 
located has a significant enough interest, under a dormant commerce clause analysis, to prohibit, 
or even regulate, this type of representation in most situations.  Often, the effect of an electronic 
representation will be born wholly in the other state where the client is located, and this state’s 
ethical regime would be ignored under the likely interpretation of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2).  
 
Therefore, jurisdictions should either eliminate the language from the rule that results in 
the application of the ethics regime of the attorney’s home jurisdiction in all situations or define 
key terms in the rule to focus the analysis on the location of the client affected and the jurisdiction 
where the legal advice provided is acted upon.  Either option will allow for the application of the 
ethics rules of the jurisdiction where the client is physically located when the most significant 
effect from the representation is felt in the client’s home jurisdiction.  Because this state has a 
much more significant interest in protecting the resident client from potentially damaging legal 
representations, this jurisdiction more properly should determine the manner in which attorneys 
can represent its residents and whether any constraints should be placed on electronic 
representations. 
 
1 Assistant Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law.  This article is dedicated to my sons, Max, Alex 
and Ben, who were born shortly before I began to write this article.  You will probably never be able 
entirely to understand what your mother and I went through to have, raise and love you all.  The author 
would like to thank Professor Catherine Lanctot and Professor Allan Ides for reviewing earlier drafts of this 
article and providing helpful comments.   
2 Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l, Informal Op. 98-85, at 1 (1998). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Internet3 has changed the manner in which many attorneys serve and procure 
clients.  For example, e-mail4 now allows attorneys to respond to clients more quickly 
and with less cost.5 Attorneys also can file a document electronically now in many 
 
3 “The Internet” is a term coined from the “interconnected network” that makes up this computer system. 
Ari Lanin, Note, Who Controls The Internet? States’ Rights and the Reawakening of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423 n.1 (2000).  “The Internet is a diverse set of independent 
networks, interlinked to provide its users with the appearance of a single, uniform network.” Comm. on the 
Internet in the Evolving Info. Infrastructure et al., The Internet’s Coming of Age 29 (2001).  One 
commentator defines the “Internet” as “the worldwide ‘network of networks’ that are connected to each 
other, using IP [Internet Protocol] and other similar protocols.”  Paul S. Jacobsen, Net Law:  How Lawyers 
Use the Internet 217 (1997). 
4 Also known as “electronic mail,” e-mail is computer software that allows people with an Internet 
connection to send “messages documents, and graphics to other people connected to the Internet.”  
Jacobsen, supra note 3, at 215. 
5See John A Wetenkamp, Note, The Impact of E-mail on Attorney Practice and Ethics, 34 McGeorge L. 
Rev. 135, 136 (2002) (stating that e-mail can “save clients money because it tends to streamline 
communications and it costs less than a telephone call”); Brett R. Harris, Counseling Clients Over the 
Internet, 18 Computer & Internet Law. 4, 4 (2001) (noting that e-mail “can be transmitted quickly and 
without undue expense” and that e-mail “at times [is] more practical and economical than telephone or 
facsimile transmissions”).  Additionally, the use of e-mail attachments can speed up client review of 
document drafts and consequently increase the speed at which attorneys can draft and have documents 
filed.  See Harris, supra, at 4 (stating that e-mail attachments can “be revised by the recipients 
electronically and then returned to the sender, in effect creating a collaborative effort to get documents into 
final form”).    
Attorney use of e-mail to communicate with clients originally was controversial.  See Jason 
Krause, Guarding the Cyberfort, ABA J., July 2003, at 42-43 (discussing the “debate in the legal 
community” from 1995 to 1999 “about whether it was safe to practice law over the Internet” and stating 
that some firms even issued bans on attorney use of e-mail).  In 1999, the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”) issued an ethics opinion stating that a lawyer could transmit client information by e-mail under 
most circumstances without violating professional ethics rules.  ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) (finding that an attorney can “transmit information relating to 
the representation of a client by unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet” without violating professionial 
ethics rules “because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a 
technological and legal standpoint”).  Many attorneys now routinely communicate with clients through e-
mail.  See ABA Legal Technology Resource Center, June 2000 Telephone Survey:  How Attorneys Use E-
Mail, at http://www.lawtechnology.org/surveys/june2000.html (indicating that, according to a June 2000 
telephone survey, 94 percent of attorneys used e-mail in their practices and 71 percent used e-mail to 
communicate with clients).   
Despite the current widespread use of e-mail by attorneys to communicate with clients, some 
commentators still point out the confidentiality risks posed by communicating with clients in this manner 
due to the risk of unauthorized interception of e-mail.  Robert M. Battress & Joseph D. Harbaugh, Taking 
the Lawyer’s Craft into Virtual Space:  Computer-Mediated Interviewing, Counseling & Negotiating, 10 
Clinical L. Rev. 115, 151 (2003) (“Concerns continue to exist regarding the ability of hackers and persons 
with ulterior motives to intercept emails and also the capacity of service providers to intrude on 
communications.”); R. Scot Hopkins & Pamela R. Reynolds, Redefining Privacy and Security in the 
Electronic Communication Age:  A Lawyer’s Ethical Duty in the Virtual World of the Internet, 16 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 675, 676 (2003) (“[T]the ease with which email communications may be intercepted make it a 
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courts.6 Additionally, the World Wide Web (the “Web”)7 allows attorneys  to market 
themselves on a more widespread basis through law firm Web sites.8 The marketing of 
legal services on the Web has become so pervasive that several freestanding Web sites 
now exist with the purpose of matching potential clients with attorneys.9 Often, allowing 
people to make their initial inquiry to an attorney through an e-mail or a client intake 
form provided on a Web site eases an attorney’s screening of potential clients.10 
In a more dramatic development, the Internet is becoming the primary, or in some 
cases sole, manner in which particular attorneys serve clients.  For example, some of the 
Web sites designed to match clients with attorneys also allow attorneys to provide legal 
 
particulary ripe target for even unsophisticated email thieves, and that this attribute is unique to Internet 
email.”). 
6 Maria Perez Crist, The E-Brief: Legal Writing for an Online World, 33 N.M. L. Rev. 49, 54 (2003) 
(describing the federal courts’ Case Management/Electronic Case Files program that “allows attorneys to 
log in to court web sites with a court-issued password and submit documents to the court electronically”). 
7 The Web is a “hypertext–based system for finding and accessing Internet resources.”  Jacobsen, supra 
note 3, at 223.  The Web uses “Hypertext Markup Language,” or HTML, to tell a computer exactly how to 
display a document so that a page on a computer screen appears exactly how it appears in its printed 
version.  Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information Superhighway:  State 
Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. Publ. 
Law 191, 262 (2003). 
8 Beyond just providing general information about the firm and its attorneys, law firm Web sites often 
provide information or articles on particular legal issues or topics concerning the firm’s practice areas that 
would be of interest to potential clients or the general public.  See Make the Most of the Web to Expand 
Your Practice 1 (LexisNexis/Martindale Hubbell 2004) (providing a checklist for law firm Web sites that 
includes “recent articles written” as a way to “showcase your firm’s credentials”); William Hornsby, 
Improving the Delivery of Affordable Legal Services Through the Internet:  A Blueprint for the Shift to a 
Digital Paradigm 6 (Nov. 1999) in The Changing Face of Legal Practice:  A National Conference on 
“Unbundled” Legal Services, Conference Materials (2000), at 
http://www.unbundledlaw.org/program/program.htm (stating that law firm Web sites typically include 
“material that demonstrate the firm’s capacity, such as articles”).  As of September 2004, Hornsby was staff 
attorney to the ABA Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services.  Mark Hansen, Helping Self-
Helpers, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2004, at 72. 
9 See, e.g., www.lawyers.com, www.legalmatch.com, www.attorneypages.com. “Many online directories 
are contained within web sites as parts of other information and services.  In other words, the directories 
that help consumers find lawyers are a subsidiary part of a site with general consumer information about 
legal issues or the subject matter of interest to the consumer.”  Hornsby, supra  note 8, at 7. 
10 See Terry Carter, Casting for Clients, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2004, at 35, 37 (discussing an attorney who screens 
potential clients through e-mail “which has added the value of being more efficient than fielding phone 
calls” and a Web site, www.legalmatch.com, that allows potential clients to “fill out forms online detailing 
their circumstances and problems” for lawyer review); Hornsby, supra note 8, at 12 (stating that “law firms 
are using web sites for automated intake and screening in several different practice settings”).   
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advice to clients directly through the site.11 On Internet “bulletin boards” or 
“newsgroups,”12 potential clients post questions seeking legal advice under various legal 
topics, and attorneys can provide legal advice by posting a reply.  The potential also 
exists for attorneys to participate in Internet “chat rooms”13 where they would respond in 
real time to posts seeking legal information.14 In addition to these third party operated 
Web sites, some attorneys are developing practices where they communicate with clients 
solely through their firm Web site or e-mail.15 
Electronic representations of clients, or what this article loosely terms “e-
lawyering,” are part of a larger, emerging trend among the legal profession to segment or 
“unbundle”16 legal services in an attempt to serve the largely unmet legal needs of people 
with moderate to low incomes.17 In the past, states have had differing views on the 
 
11 See, e.g., www.lawyers.com, www.legalmatch.com.  For a discussion of how an attorney-client 
relationship can be created through such Web sites, see infra Section II. C. 
12 An Internet “bulletin board” is “an electronic bulletin board on a network where electronic messages may 
be posted and browsed by users or delivered to e-mail boxes.” Ill. State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. 96-10 
(1997).  See also Brad Hunt, Comment, Lawyers in Cyberspace:  Legal Malpractice on Computer Bulletin 
Boards, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 553, 554 (1996) (describing “bulletin boards” as “notice boards in 
cyberspace where people discuss legal issues and ask and answer questions about the law”).  A 
“newsgroup” is an online discussion forum “categorized by subject, in which people post and read 
messages” on a Web site.  Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace, 49 Duke L.J. 
147, 151 (1999).  See also Ill. State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. 96-10 (describing a “newsgroup” as “a type of 
bulletin board service in which users can exchange information on a particular subject”).  Effectively, 
“bulletin boards” and “newsgroups” are terms for very similar, if not exactly the same, Internet activity.  
Therefore, this article will use the term Internet “bulletin board” to refer to both types of activity from this 
point forward.   
13 A “chat room” is a “simultaneous or ‘real time’ bulletin board or newsgroup among users who send their 
questions or comments over the Internet.”  Ill. State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. 96-10.  See also Lanctot, 
supra note 12, at 152 (describing a “chat room” as a different version of a newsgroup “in which two or 
more individuals may communicate in ‘real time,’ receiving responses on the screen as soon as they are 
typed in”). 
14 See infra Section II. A. for a more in-depth description of electronic bulletin boards and chat rooms that 
allow attorneys to provide legal advice to users. 
15 See infra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
16 “Unbundling” of legal services involves “a lawyer and client [agreeing] to limit representation to 
discrete, specified tasks.” Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 100 (2004).  See also Hansen, supra note 8, 
at 72 (describing unbundling of legal services as situations where a “lawyer contracts to perform specific, 
limited work for the client without taking on responsibility for the entire case”).   
17 See Hansen, supra note 8, at 72 (noting that “since 2000, six states[,  California, Colorado, Florida, 
Maine, Washington and Wyoming,] have formally adopted various changes in their ethics cods or civil 
Copyright © 2006 by Michael W. Loudenslager 
6
acceptability of nontraditional forums for attorneys to provide advice to clients.18 States 
have already taken differing views on whether it is acceptable for an attorney to engage 
in electronic representations of clients.19 Furthermore, practices in which attorneys 
predominantly use the Internet to communicate with clients enable attorneys more easily 
to represent people that are physically located in other jurisdictions where the attorney 
may not have a license to practice law.  Therefore, determining what jurisdiction’s law 
applies to such attorney conduct could be very important in deciding whether this activity 
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.  Even if states allow such representations, 
various states may afford clients with different protections and require attorneys to take 
different precautions when involved in an electronic representation of a client.  Therefore, 
the particular jurisdiction’s ethics rules that apply to such electronic representations can 
be further important in determining the exact duties of an attorney.       
 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) recently amended the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) to deal with various attorney multi-jurisdictional 
 
procedure rules to accommodate unbundling and assisted pro se representation” and “at least 11 other states 
have begun to study the issue actively”). 
18See Lanctot, supra note12 , at 218 (stating that “each time that lawyers have sought to adapt existing 
media to answer legal questions posed by laypeople, the organized bar has moved to regulate—potentially 
out of existence—such activity” and going on to examine how different states have treated nontraditional 
forums for attorneys to provide legal advice where the attorney has limited ability to follow up on the 
advice given or to ask follow up questions of the client).   
19 Compare D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Op. 316 (2002) (allowing “lawyers to take part in online chat 
rooms and similar arrangements through which attorneys engage in back-and-forth communications, in 
‘real time” or nearly real time, with Internet users seeking legal information,” but advising attorneys that “if 
an attorney-client relationship is formed through cyberspace communications” the “relationship brings to 
bear all of the responsibilities and benefits defined under the D.C. Rules governing attorney-client 
relationships”), and N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998) (finding that “using the 
Internet to take orders for trademark searches, conduct trademark searches, render legal opinions and file 
trademark applications is analogous to conducting a law practice by telephone or facsimile machine and is 
likewise permissible, subject to the same restrictions applicable to communication by those means”) with 
Ariz. Comm.on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 97-04 (1997) (stating that “lawyers should not answer 
specific legal questions from lay people through the Internet unless the question presented is of a general 
nature and the advice given is not fact-specific”), and Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. A-00-1 
(prohibiting “an attorney’s participation in a chat room” as a direct, “in person” solicitation).  
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practice issues, including Model Rule 8.5(b), which governs choice of ethics law.20 
Given how courts and state ethics committees have construed prior versions of Model 
Rule 8.5(b), 21 courts likely will interpret the current language of this rule and its safe 
harbor provision to apply the legal ethics rules of the state in which the attorney is located 
to all electronic representations.22 This raises concerns under the “dormant” aspect of the 
Commerce Clause.    
 The dormant commerce clause prevents states from promulgating legislation or 
regulations that frustrate or inhibit trade between states, even in the absence of 
Congressional legislation.23 When a state’s regulations prohibit activity that does not 
occur or have significant effect within its physical boundaries, this often violates the 
dormant commerce clause.24 If in the context of Internet representations courts construe 
Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) always to apply the legal ethics rules of the state in which the 
lawyer is physically located, it is not clear that state has a significant enough interest, 
under a dormant commerce clause analysis, to prohibit, or even regulate, this type of 
representation in most situations.25 This occurs because often the effect of an electronic 
representation will be born wholly in the other state where the client is located, and this is 
 
20 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5, 8.5 (2002).  See also infra Section III. D. (explaining the recent 
amendments to Model Rule 8.5(b)). 
21 See infra Section IV. 
22 See infra notes 181–184 and accompanying text. 
23 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945) (“For hundreds of years it has been accepted 
constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords 
some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where 
Congress has not acted, [the United States Supreme Court], and not the state legislature, is under the 
commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests.”) 
24 See infra notes 194, 209–210 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra Section VII. B. 2. 
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the state whose ethical regime would end up being ignored under the likely interpretation 
of the current language of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2).26 
A more sound choice of ethics rule under the dormant commerce clause would be 
to use the current language of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) without the safe harbor language that 
will result in the application of the ethics regime of the attorney’s home jurisdiction in all 
situations.27 Another option would be to retain the safe harbor but define key terms in the 
rule to focus the analysis on the location of the client affected by the legal representation 
and the jurisdiction where the legal advice provided in the representation is acted upon 
and takes effect.28 Either option would allow for the application of ethics rules of the 
jurisdiction where the client is physically located in situations when the most significant 
effect from the representation is felt in the client’s home jurisdiction.29 This state has a 
much more significant interest in protecting the resident client from incompetent and 
potentially damaging legal representations.30 Consequently, this jurisdiction more 
properly should determine the manner in which attorneys can represent its residents and 
whether any constraints should be placed on circumscribed and non-traditional 
representations, if it decides to allow them at all.31 In this manner, the state of the client’s 
residence, more often than not, would balance the risks of this more limited type of 
Internet legal representation against the potential to more effectively meet the legal needs 
of moderate and low income residents.  
 
26 See infra Section VII. C. 
27 See infra Section VIII. 
28 See id. 
29 See id.  
30 See infra Section VII. B. 1. 
31 See infra Section VIII. 
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II. THE GROWTH OF E-LAWYERING 
A. The Different Types of E-Lawyering 
Attorney conduct on the Internet can occur in four main type of contexts: in chat 
rooms, on bulletin boards, through a law firm web site or through e-mail 
communications.  In some electronic representations of a client, an attorney might even 
engage in a combination of these activities.  Activity in an Internet chat room or on an 
Internet bulletin board involves a potential client posting a question seeking advice on a 
particular legal topic and then receiving responses in subsequent posts from other 
individuals who have registered with the web site.32 Examples of the particular legal 
topics into which a bulletin board may be divided include “Accident and Injury Law,” 
“Consumer & General Practice Law,” “Family Law,” and “Real Estate Law,” among 
others.33 After having received a response, the person making the initial post then can 
respond to questions presented in the subsequent posts or ask for clarification of 
information that others have provided.  On some sites, such as on freeadvice.com, the 
person making the initial legal inquiry is required to indicate the jurisdiction in which 
they are located.34 Some Web sites providing chat rooms or bulletin boards are free to 
visitors of the site, often such sites provide other services such as a directory of attorneys 
in a particular area,35 while others charge a fee to users of the site.36 
32 See, e.g, www.freeadvice.com.  See also D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 316 (2002) (describing a 
chat room exchange between an individual seeking advice on immigration law and a responsive post from 
an attorney); Lanctot, supra note 12, at 152-53 (describing Web sites with bulletin boards that “encourage 
laypeople to post legal questions, identifying their state of residence, and suggest that lawyers who are 
licensed to practice in those states post responses”); Hunt, supra note 12, at 554 (“Legal bulletin boards are 
notice boards in cyberspace where people discuss legal issues and ask and answer questions about the 
law.”). 
33 These examples are provided from www.freeadvice.com. 
34 www.freeadvice.com. 
35 See, e.g., www.lawyers.com, www.legalmatch.com. 
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The difference between an Internet chat room and an Internet bulletin board is 
that the communications in the chat room occur in real time.37 Thus, the posts in a chat 
room occur very rapidly one after another.  On an Internet bulletin board, posts occur 
more slowly over several hours or even days.  Therefore, the amount of time in which an 
attorney would have to consider a potential client’s post and then form and post an 
answer to the request for legal information would be much quicker in a chat room than on 
an Internet bulletin board.     
 In addition to communicating with potential clients in chat rooms or bulletin 
boards, some attorneys are engaging in electronic lawyering in a more formal manner by 
allowing clients to communicate with an attorney through a particular part of the firm’s 
web site or filling out a client intake form for potential clients on the firm web site or a 
web site run by a third party.38 Some Web sites allow clients to fill out their own legal 
forms in a “decision-tree format” and then have an attorney review the documents before 
 
36 See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 316 n. 3 (2002) (describing one “multi-purpose site” offering real 
time chats with attorneys for $15 for a single chat or an annual subscription to the chat room for $30 per 
month and another Web site that “charged $10 for a one-week subscription”); Darren Franklin, Hanging a 
Shingle on the Information Superhighway:  Legal Advice on the Internet and Problems of Prohibited Client 
Solicitation and Unintended Attorney-Client Relationships, 2001 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2, ¶4, 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/01_STLR_2/index.htm (describing USLaw.com which “offers a 
$9.95 single-use ($24.95 annual subscription) ‘Ask a Lawyer’ feature that lets users have ‘private one-on-
one live chats with licensed lawyers’”). 
37 See Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. A-00-1 (2000) (stating that “the term ‘chat room’ refers to a 
real time communication between computer users”); Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, 
Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997) (stating that a “‘chat’ group is a simultaneous or ‘real time’ bulletin board or 
newsgroup among users who send their questions or comments over the Internet”); Utah State Bar Ethics 
Advisory Comm., Op. 97-10 (1997) (stating that communication in a “chat room” involves “simultaneous 
participation of several users in a real-time exchange of written messages” that “is more analogous to an in-
person conversation due to its direct, confrontational nature”). 
38 See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005) 
(describing a hypothetical firm web site that allows prospective clients to make their initial inquiry to the 
firm by fill out an electronic form asking for the inquirer’s name and contact information as well as a short 
description of his or her legal problem and any initial questions the inquirer has); The client intake forms 
available on Web sites can range from a one page form asking for very basic information, see the intake 
form on www.njdebtrelief.com, to several screens that ask for, among other things, a detailed description of 
the client’s situation and needs, see the intake screens for www.legalmatch.com.   
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the client receives the documents.39 Other sites allow clients to question attorneys on 
discrete questions for a flat fee.40 
Furthermore, some attorneys are engaging in more traditional practices where the 
attorney provides a fuller array of legal services but all of the communications with a 
client occur through the firm Web site or through e-mail.41 Some attorneys are finding 
that such practices are more efficient and also allow them to find new clients without 
having to battle for clients in a more limited and immediate geographic area.42 However, 
engaging in such representations increases the likelihood that the client will be located in 
a different jurisdiction and have a legal question pertaining to the law of that particular 
jurisdiction rather than the law of the jurisdiction in which the attorney is located and 
licensed.43 
39 Terry Carter, Law Tech Generations:  Newer Versions of Firm Web Sites Boldly Go Where Few Law 
Firms Have Gone Before, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2004, at 22. 
40 See Franklin, supra note , at ¶¶ 5-6 (describing “www.legalmatch.com, where visitors can get legal 
advice for $39.95 a question” and “the LegalEase Home Page” which “charges visitors $25 to answer their 
immigration law questions”). 
41 See, e.g., Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 00-4 (2000) (allowing attorney “to provide limited, on-
line legal services to Florida residents on simple matters not requiring office visits or court appearances” 
such as “simple wills, incorporation papers, real estate contracts, residential leases and uncontested marital 
agreements” as long as “the attorney complies with the ethics rules”).  N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on 
Prof’l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998) (finding that “using the Internet to take orders for trademark searches, 
conduct trademark searches, render legal opinions and file trademark applications is analogous to 
conducting a law practice by telephone or facsimile machine and is likewise permissible, subject to the 
same restrictions applicable to communication by those means”); Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal 
Ethics, Op. 1791 (2003) (allowing an attorney to engage in a bankruptcy practice in which he would 
communicate with clients without any face-to-face meetings but “via electronic communication so long as 
the content and caliber of those services otherwise comport with the duties and competence and 
communication”).   
42 See Carter, supra note 10, at 35 (discussing an attorney who screens potential clients through e-mail 
“which has added the value of being more efficient than fielding phone calls” ); Hornsby, supra note 8, at 
13, 16 (stating that providing “on-line advice overcomes geographic obstacles and provides a convenient 
alternative to a face-to-face encounter” and that “using a digital strategy to expand the geographic area 
would allow the lawyer access to a larger volume of unbundled cases without consuming a larger 
percentage of the marketplace for the immediate jurisdiction”). 
43 Hunt, supra note 12, at 556 (“[L]awyers in cyberspace will probably receive many questions from people 
who live in states (or even nations, given the international nature of cyberspace) other than those in which 
they are licensed to practice law.”). 
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B. Demand for E-Lawyering 
The demand for legal services delivered over the Internet springs from the great 
unmet need for legal representation of poor and moderate income Americans.  As far as 
citizens of little means are concerned, legal services offices only are able to address “less 
than a fifth of the needs of eligible clients.”44 Of the poor who are able to obtain legal 
assistance through such offices, many “must wait over two years before seeing a lawyer 
for matters like divorce,” which don’t qualify as emergencies.45 Furthermore, such 
services are not available at all for many people “just over the poverty line” who cannot 
afford an attorney but who do not meet income eligibility requirements.46 
With regard to the middle class, one survey indicated that less than half of 
moderate income households with a legal need actually consulted an attorney.47 
According to the same survey, less than forty percent of moderate income households 
used the courts to address their legal problems.48 Almost a quarter of the households 
surveyed handled the problem on their own while a little over a quarter took no action at 
all.49 Moreover, “[t]wo thirds of surveyed Americans [agreed] that it [was] ‘not 
affordable to bring a case in court.’”50 Another survey conducted in Maryland indicated 
 
44 Rhode, supra note 16, at 13. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Hornsby, supra note 8, at 2 (citing the results of a 1992 survey conducted by the ABA indicating that 43 
percent of moderate income households with a legal need consulted an attorney).  See also Rhode, supra 
note 16, at 79 (citing same survey and stating that “about two-thirds of the civil legal needs of moderate-
income consumers were not taken to lawyers or the judicial system”). 
48 Hornsby, supra note 8, at 2.  See also Modest Means Task Force, ABA Section of Litig., Handbook on 
Limited Scope Legal Assistance 10 (2003) (referring to ABA study finding that “7 out 10 low-income 
households and 6 out of 10 moderate-income households that had legal problems did not use our legal 
system to resolve them”).  
49 Hornsby, supra note8 , at 2 (citing ABA survey indicating that twenty-three percent (23%) of households 
surveyed dealt with the legal problem on their own and twenty-six percent (26%) of households took no 
action at all).   
50 Rhode, supra note 16, at 80. See also Cristina L. Underwood, Comment, Balancing Consumer Interests 
in a Digital Age:  A New Approach to Regulating the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 437, 
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that almost three quarters of the people in the middle class “no longer [contacted] an 
attorney when faced with a legal problem.”51 
The lack of affordability of legal counsel has resulted in a large increase in the 
number of people filing cases pro se.52 Especially in the areas of housing, bankruptcy 
and family law, as well as in small claims court, more people than not handle their 
lawsuits without using an attorney.53 “In some jurisdictions, over four-fifths of cases 
involving these matters involve self-represented ‘pro se’ individuals.”54 This increase in 
self-representation further enhances individuals’ dissatisfaction with the legal system.  
Only approximately one-half of people of middle income were happy with the result 
when they handled their legal problems on their own, and only one-third of the 
individuals who took no action were pleased with the result.55 This contrasts with the 
two-thirds of people satisfied with the outcome among those who consulted attorneys to 
deal with their legal problems.56 
One effort to address the unmet legal needs of so many Americans has been to 
develop technological solutions.57 The use of Internet representations is one way in 
which technology can help middle, and even many low, income individuals obtain some 
 
442  (2004) (“Many low- and moderate-income households simply cannot afford the cost of personal legal 
services.”). 
51 Rhode, supra note 16, at 79.   
52 See Hornsby, supra note 8, at 3 (citing same Maryland survey that found that “57 percent of pro se 
litigants [in Maryland] proceeded pro se because they could not afford an attorney”). 
53 Rhode, supra note 16, at 14.  In uncontested divorces, between sixty and ninety percent of cases involve 
at least one pro se party. Id. at 82.  See also Modest Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 8 (stating that 
“[n]ationally, in three or four out of every five [domestic relations] cases one of the two parties is 
unrepresented” and that “both parties are unrepresented in two or three out of every five cases”). 
54 Rhode, supra note 16, at 14. 
55 Id. at 80.  See also Modest Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 14 n.30 (referring to Oregon survey 
indicating that about seventy-five percent (75%) of people with a legal need who didn’t retain counsel were 
“dissatisfied with the outcome of the case”). 
56 Rhode, supra note 16, at 80. 
57 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., How to Practice Law with Computers 59 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that the lack of 
affordability of legal services by middle class Americans has created the potential “for deploying computer 
technology creatively to define entirely new legal services products for ordinary citizens”).   
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degree of legal advice instead of addressing their legal problems wholly on their own.58 
Many types of e-lawyering that currently exist represent part of a larger attempt to serve 
unmet legal needs by “unbundling” legal services.59 Under such arrangements, an 
attorney agrees with a client to complete discrete legal tasks rather than carrying out a 
whole case from beginning to end.60 The idea is that many people who now proceed pro 
se, or opt out of the legal system altogether, would be able to afford and would use 
reasonably priced limited representations if this were an option.61 The ABA recently 
modified the Model Rules to better allow for such discrete task representations,62 and 
 
58 See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 316 (2002) (“Advocates of the provision of low-cost legal advice 
through on-line chat rooms and similar innovative services make the important point that these services 
offer great potential for providing low-cost legal services to low and moderate income persons.”); Lanctot, 
supra note 12, at 250 (stating that providing legal advice over the Internet “has the potential to serve the 
unmet legal needs of millions of Americans of low and moderate income who cannot afford to hire 
attorneys, at a time when the number of lawyers in the United States continues to expand”); Hunt, supra 
note 12, at 555 (“Legal information is also considerably less expensive when obtained in cyberspace rather 
than in person.”) 
59 See Lanctot, supra note 12, at 253 (stating that “[i]n many ways, giving specific legal advice to clients 
online, while expressly disclaiming any additional responsibilities, is a classic example of discrete task 
representation” and that “[b]y unbundling these services, the lawyer can give at least limited assistance to 
the person who needs help . . . and the client can obtain recourse that he otherwise could not obtain”). 
60 See Modest Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 4 (describing “limited scope legal assistance” as “a 
designated service or services, rather than the full package of traditionally offered services”); Rhode, supra 
note 16, at 100 (describing unbundling of legal services as where “a lawyer and client agree to limit 
representation to discrete, specified tasks”); Lanctot, supra note 12, at 253 (“The model is that of a menu of 
legal tasks from which the client, in consultation with the lawyer, is permitted to purchase only the services 
that he needs or can afford.”); Hansen, supra note 8, at 72 (describing unbundling of legal services as a 
“lawyer [contracting] to perform specific, limited work for the client without taking on responsibility for 
the entire case”).   
Several other terms are used to describe this type of representation including “‘discrete task’ 
representation, ‘limited scope assistance’, or just ‘limited assistance’ or ‘limited representation.’”  Modest 
Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 5.  “Common forms of unbundled legal services involve court 
appearances or trial representation; telephone, Internet or brief in-person advice; and assistance with 
negotiations, pretrial discovery, or document preparation.” Rhode, supra note 16, at 100.  
61 Modest Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 9, 11 (stating that “[m]any pro se litigants have enough 
disposable income to pay for the limited representation they need” and that “[m]any of those who opt out, 
or who are forced out, of the legal system would use the legal system to resolve their disputes, and retain 
lawyers to represent them, if lawyers offered them reasonable limited-service options”).  “Limited 
representation, therefore, is an important means to provide people with access to justice.”  Id. at 11. 
62 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 1.2(c) (2002) (stating that a “lawyer may limit the scope of the 
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed 
consent”); ABA Comm’n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Report with Recommendation to 
the House of Delegates 23 (Aug. 2001) (stating that the intent of revising Rule 1.2(c) was “to provide a 
framework within which lawyers may expand access to legal services by providing limited but nonetheless 
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more and more state disciplinary authorities formally are approving of such 
representations.63 Therefore, providing limited legal advice to clients over the Internet 
potentially could become an important part of the effort to satisfy unmet legal needs 
through the unbundled or discrete task representation model. 
C. Formation of Attorney-Client Relationship Through E-Lawyering 
When attorneys interact over the Internet in a more limited manner with potential 
clients, such as in an Internet chat room or on a bulletin board, the issue arises of 
when the interaction between the attorney and the potential client forms an actual 
attorney-client relationship.  This is important because if an attorney-client relationship is 
not formed several of the ethical obligations owed to a client will not apply.64 
Consequently, at least one jurisdiction’s ethics opinion on electronic representations 
advises attorneys to post disclaimers stating that an attorney-client relationship is not 
 
valuable legal service to low or moderate-income persons who otherwise would be unable to obtain 
counsel”).  Moreover, many of the ethics opinions dealing with unbundled legal services “identify Model 
Rule 1.2 as the source of authority for limited-service agreements.”  Modest Means Task Force, supra note 
48, at 86. 
63 See, e.g., Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 05-06 at 5-6 (2005) (approving of “limited scope 
representations” as long as certain conditions are met); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 101 
(1998) (allowing an attorney to provide “unbundled legal services in both litigation and non-litigation 
matters” as long as the attorney can make a sufficient “inquiry into and analysis of” the applicable law and 
facts); Tenn. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2005-F-151 (2005) (acknowledging that Rule 1.2(c) 
“allows a lawyer to limit the scope of a client’s representation if the client consents and if the limitation is 
reasonable under the circumstances” and approving of Pro Se clinic where attorneys provide “limited 
advice and assistance without becoming counsel of record” to domestic relations litigants).  See also 
Modest Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 116-20, 124-27 (describing how Colorado, Maine and 
Washington have revised their ethics rules to facilitate the provision of unbundled legal services); Hansen, 
supra note 8, at 72 (noting that “since 2000, six states[, California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Washington 
and Wyoming,] have formally adopted various changes in their ethics codes or civil procedure rules to 
accommodate unbundling and assisted pro se representation” and “at least 11 other states have begun to 
study the issue actively”). 
64 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (2000) (Introductory Note) (“A fundamental 
distinction is involved between clients, to whom lawyers owe many duties, and nonclients, to who lawyers 
owe fewer duties. . . . Prospective and former clients receive certain protections, but not all of those due to 
clients.”). 
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created through the activity on the Web site concerned.65 However, Professor Catherine 
Lanctot has concluded that such disclaimers will be ineffective if the subsequent activity 
of the attorney and client indicate that the parties actually have formed an attorney-client 
relationship.66 
Moreover, Professor Lanctot concludes that much of the activity that occurs 
between attorneys and clients in chat rooms and bulletin boards would be sufficient to 
form an attorney-client relationship.67 Generally, an attorney-client relationship arises 
when: (1) an individual manifests an intent for an attorney to provide legal services to 
them; and (2) that attorney either (a) manifests to the individual an intent to provide the 
legal services or (b) the attorney “fails to manifest a lack of consent” to provide the legal 
services to the individual knowing, or under the circumstances reasonably should know, 
that the individual “reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services.”68 Much of 
the activity on Internet chat rooms and bulletin boards likely will form an attorney 
 
65 See D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 302 (2000) (suggesting the use of disclaimers “on ‘click through’ boxes 
or pages, which require visitors to verify that they have read important information by clicking on a 
specified area of the screen before proceeding” in an opinion addressing an Internet Web site seeking 
plaintiffs for class action lawsuits). 
66 Lanctot, supra note 12, at 193 ( “I expect that neither courts nor bar disciplinary authorities are likely to 
be sympathetic to cyberspace attorneys who rely on disclaimers as all-purpose shields.  In my view, if the 
legal advice given is specifically tailored to the factual circumstances presented, that conduct will suffice to 
create an attorney-client relationship, regardless of what boilerplate disclaimers the lawyer attaches to the 
advice.”).   
However, Professor Lanctot goes on to conclude that disclaimers might be effective in limiting the 
scope of an electronic representation.  Id. at 195 (“[A] disclaimer that limited the online lawyer’s 
obligations to providing a competent legal response, without further requiring the lawyer to take steps to 
protect the client’s interest, arguably could be consistent with [the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and the Restatement (Third) of  the Law Governing Lawyers], if the circumstances of the 
exchange reflected informed consent.”).  Nevertheless, “there are core attributes of the attorney-client 
relationship, such as basic competency, that cannot be bargained away.”  Id. See also Modest Means Task 
Force, supra note 48, at 8 (stating that “lawyers owe the same duties of loyalty, confidentiality, diligence, 
and competence to limited-service clients that they do to full-service clients”). 
67 See Lanctot, supra note 12, at 184 (“In short, lawyers who provide specific legal advice online may find 
it difficult at some future point to persuade a court or bar counsel that they did not intend to incur any 
professional obligations by answering questions in cyberspace.”). 
68 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (2000).  See also Lanctot, supra note 12, at 
168-69 (setting out and explaining the Restatement test for formation of an attorney-client relationship). 
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relationship in the following manner.  First, the site user posts a legal question 
manifesting an intent to have a lawyer perform legal services, specifically by asking for 
legal advice and a recommendation on a course of action given the facts of the poster’s 
situation.69 Second, an attorney manifests his or her intent to perform the requested legal 
services by actual performance, particularly by providing specific legal advice in 
response to the original user’s post.70 Alternatively, an attorney could form an attorney-
client relationship by posting a reply to the original site user’s post knowing that the user 
will rely on the legal advice provided.71 Thus, as long as the attorney is providing legal 
advice specifically tailored to the user’s situation, an attorney-client relationship will be 
formed.72 Moreover, even if an attorney limits the objectives in the representation, this 
does not do away with the obligations that an attorney owes a client with regard to those 
specific objectives.73 
69 Lanctot, supra note 12, at 169 (“[T]he online posting of a specific legal question by a layperson 
manifests the intent to have a lawyer perform legal services—specifically, to provide legal advice.”).   
70 Id. (“The lawyer can also manifest consent by performance—that is, by providing the requested legal 
advice.”). 
71 Id. at 169-70 (“[F]urnishing specific legal advice in response to the question, without more, can 
constitute consent regardless of the lawyer’s subjective intent” because the attorney can “still incur the 
obligations of a professional relationship if the lawyer knows or should reasonably know that the questioner 
is reasonably relying on the lawyer’s advice.”).  See also Franklin, supra note 36, at 14 (“An attorney-client 
relationship, therefore, does not require an explicit agreement; it may arise by implication from a Web site 
visitor’s reasonable expectation of legal representation and the online attorney’s failure to dispel those 
expectations.”). 
72 Lanctot, supra note 12, at 183 (“[G]iving specific legal advice in response to a set of particular facts is 
the hallmark of the practice of law, while providing general information is not.  Second, it is reasonable for 
a putative client to rely on advice that is specifically tailored to his [or her] particular request, and the 
courts are clear that it is the reasonable belief of the client that will govern.”). See also Ill. State Bar Ass’n 
Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997) (“[L]awyers participating in chat groups or other 
on-line services that could involve offering personalized legal advice to anyone who happens to be 
connected to the service should be mindful that the recipients of such advise [sic] are the lawyer’s clients, 
with the potential benefits and burdens of that relationship.”); Or. State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Governors, 
Formal Op. 1991-101 (1991) (“In essence, the practice of law involves the application of a general body of 
legal knowledge to the problem of a specific entity or individual.”); Underwood, supra note 50, at 450-52, 
462-63 (2004) (describing the test that the majority of state courts use to determine whether the practice of 
law has occurred as examining whether the advice provided is tailored to the specific circumstances of the 
consumer). 
73 See Modest Means Task Force, supra note 48, at 8 (stating that “lawyers owe the same duties of loyalty, 
confidentiality, diligence, and competence to limited-service clients that they do to full-service clients”); 
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Even if an attorney-client relationship is not formed, though, an attorney may still 
owe certain duties of confidentiality and loyalty to prospective clients.  With regard to 
information learned from a prospective client in the initial consultation, Model Rule 1.18 
states that an attorney owes a prospective client the same duty of confidentiality owed to 
former clients.74 The attorney also cannot represent someone with materially adverse 
interests to the prospective client in “the same or a substantially related matter” if the 
attorney received “significantly harmful” information from the prospective client.75 The 
rule further imputes this disqualification to other members of the attorney’s firm.76 An 
attorney’s firm can avoid disqualification if the attorney “took reasonable steps to avoid 
exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine 
whether to represent the prospective client,” the attorney is appropriately screened, the 
attorney receives no part of the fee from the matter, and the prospective client receives 
 
Hansen, supra note 8, at 72 (stating that in the larger context of unbundled legal services generally “[m]any 
of the [ethics] opinions also agree that an attorney-client relationship still exists when legal services are 
provided on a limited basis”).  But see Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 1.2 cmt. 7 (2002) (“Although 
an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent 
representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
74 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18(b) (2003) (“Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a 
lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective client shall not use or reveal information learned in the 
consultation, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to the information of a former client.”).  See 
also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 15(1)(a) (2000) (stating that when an attorney 
has discussions with a prospective client about “the possibility of their forming a client-lawyer relationship 
for a matter and no such relationship ensues,” the attorney must “not subsequently disclose confidential 
information learned in the consultation, except to the extent permitted with respect to confidential 
information of a client or former client”). 
 Model Rule 1.18 defines a “prospective client” as a “person who discusses with a lawyer the 
possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.”  Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
R. 1.18(a) (2003).  Comment 2 to the rule goes on to state that someone who communicates “unilaterally to 
a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming 
a client-lawyer relationship, is not a ‘prospective client.’”  Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18 cmt. 2 
(2003). 
75 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18(c) (2003). 
76 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18(c) (2003). 
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written notice.77 Disqualification alternatively can be avoided if the attorney receives 
written “informed consent” from both parties concerned.78 Comment 5 to the rule further 
states that an attorney can avoid disqualification if the attorney expressly conditions 
discussions with the prospective client upon that individual’s “informed consent that no 
information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a 
different client in the matter.”79 Furthermore, an attorney can avoid the duty of 
confidentiality if the client expressly agrees to the attorney’s “subsequent use of 
information received from the prospective client.”80 
Therefore, when an attorney has contact with an individual seeking legal advice 
over the Internet, he or she potentially can avoid incurring the obligations owed to 
prospective clients in one of two ways.  First, the attorney can make sure that he or she 
initially learns only enough information to engage in a proper conflicts check regarding 
the matter.  Such information could be restricted to the potential party names, any other 
significant actors concerned in the matter, and the general subject matter of the 
representation.81 Presumably, this will decrease the chance that the attorney will receive 
“significantly harmful” information before discovering that a conflict with a current or 
previous client exists.82 
77 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18(d)(2) (2003).  See also Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 15(2)(a) (2000) (stating that an attorney’s firm may avoid disqualification due to 
contact with a prospective client if the “personally prohibited lawyer takes reasonable steps to avoid 
exposure to confidential information other than information appropriate to determine whether to represent 
the prospective client” and the firm properly screens the attorney). 
78 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18(d)(1) (2003). 
79 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18 cmt. 5 (2003). 
80 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18 cmt. 5 (2003).  
81 See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005) 
(stating that when a prospective client contacted an attorney through an intake form on the firm’s web site 
about a potential divorce representation, the attorney would need to know information such as “the names 
of the parties, children, [and] former spouses” in order to perform a proper conflicts check).  
82 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18 cmt. 4 (2003) (“In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying 
information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether or not to undertake a new matter 
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Second, the attorney could have the prospective client expressly consent to waive 
the obligations which Model Rule 1.18 imposes.  On an intake form on a firm Web site, 
this could be accomplished by requiring the prospective client to click on a button 
directly under language waiving these obligations in order for that individual’s 
information to be transmitted to the law firm.83 However, language simply disclaiming 
any “attorney-client relationship” or “confidential relationship” may insufficient to do 
away with the Rule 1.18 obligations.84 Instead, one state’s ethics committee has stated 
that to be effective a waiver must be written in “plain-language” and expressly state that 
“the attorney will have no duty to keep confidential the information” transmitted by the 
prospective client.85 Therefore, unless an attorney acts proactively to either limit the 
amount of information received or to have the individual seeking legal advice waive such 
obligations under express and plain language, an attorney that has contact with an 
individual seeking legal advice through the Internet at a minimum would incur the duties 
owed to prospective clients, irrespective of whether an actual attorney-client relationship 
is formed.  Moreover, it may be difficult for an attorney to implement either method 
discussed above in the context of an Internet chat room or bulletin board.  Nevertheless, 
for the purposes of the analysis in the rest of this article, I will assume that an attorney-
 
should limit the initial interview to only such information as reasonably appears necessary for that 
purpose.”). 
83 See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005) 
(providing an example of some waiver language on an Internet client intake form).  
84 See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005) (“We 
do not believe that a prospective client’s agreement to Law Firm’s terms prevented a duty of confidentiality 
from arising on the facts before us, because Law Firm’s disclosures to [the prospective client] were not 
adequate to defeat her reasonable belief that she was consulting Law Firm for the purpose of retaining Law 
Firm.”).  Cf. Barton v. U..S. Dist. Ct., 410 F.3d 1104, 1107, 1109-12 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that attorney-
client privilege applied to information submitted through Internet questionnaire seeking information on 
potential  members of class action despite disclaimer stating that filling out the questionnaire did “not 
constitute a request for legal advice and [the person filling out the form was] not forming an attorney-client 
relationship by submitting this information”). 
85 See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005). 
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client relationship is formed by the Internet activity of the attorney and potential client 
concerned.  
 In deciding whether to allow such representations to occur through the Internet, 
disciplinary authorities must wrestle with the following issues: (1) whether the initial 
communications between the parties constitute an improper solicitation by an attorney of  
a potential client;86 (2) whether the attorney can conduct a proper conflicts check before 
the attorney enters into the representation;87 (3) if the communications occur in a forum 
 
86 Compare Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 97-04 at 3 (1997) (“Communication with a 
potential client via cyberspace should not be considered either a prohibited telephone or in-person contact 
because there is not the same element of confrontation/immediacy as with prohibited mediums.  A potential 
client reading his or her e-mail, or even participating in a ‘chat room’ has the option of not responding to 
unwanted solicitations.”); D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 302 (“The potentially greater immediacy of ‘real 
time’ communications in chat rooms, as opposed to other forms of written communications, may give rise 
to concerns similar to those about ‘in person solicitation in circumstances or through means that are not 
conducive to intelligent, rational decisions’ D.C. Rule 7.1, comment [5]. . . . On the other hand, attorney 
communications with potential clients in chat rooms are probably less potentially coercive than face-to-face 
communications.”); Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997) (“On the 
other hand, lawyer participation in an electronic bulletin board, chat room, or similar service, may implicate 
Rule 7.3, which governs solicitation, the direct contact with prospective clients.  The Committee does not 
believe that merely posting general comments on a bulletin board or chat group considered solicitation.”); 
and Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 98-6 (1998) (“In the opinion of the Committee, 
conversation interactions with persons on the Internet do not constitute improper solicitations, but in any 
one particular case the interaction mahy evolve in such a way that it could be considered as such.”) with 
Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. A-00-1 (2000) (prohibiting “an attorney’s participation in a chat 
room in order to solicit professional employment” as a in-person solicitation); Mich. Standing Comm. on 
Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-276 (1996) (“[I]f a lawyer is participating in interactive communication 
on the Internet, carrying on an immediate electronic conversation.  If the communication was initiated by 
the lawyer without invitation, such ‘real time’ communications about the lawyer’s services would be 
analogous to direct solicitation, outside the activity permitted by MRPC 7.3.”); Utah State Bar Ethics 
Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 97-10 (1997) (finding “that an attorney’s advertising and solicitation 
through a chat group are ‘in person’ communications under Rule 7.3(a) and are accordingly restricted by 
the provisions of that rule” although finding that postings to “newsgroups” are “analogous to placing an 
advertisement for legal services in a narrow-interest magazine or newspaper” and are allowable); and 
W.Va. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Op. 98-03 (1998) (finding “that solicitations via real time communications 
on the computer, such as a chat room, should be treated similar to [prohibited] telephone and in-person 
solicitations”). 
87 See Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 97-04 at 4 (stating that attorneys probably should not 
respond to specific legal questions posted in “chat rooms” or “news groups” because, in part, of “the 
inability to screen for a potential conflict with an existing client (in violation of ER 1.7)”); N.Y. State Bar 
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998) (“Practicing law for clients by means of the Internet does 
not give rise to any exemption from this fundamental obligation to avoid conflicts and not to undertake a 
new representation without checking to assure that it does not create an impermissible conflict.”); Ohio Bd. 
of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-9 (1999) (“As an attorney checks for conflicts when a 
client calls or comes to his office seeking legal services, an attorney must check for conflicts when a client 
e-mails seeking legal advice.  The on-line intake form should provide a way for the law firm to make a 
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open to the public, whether the attorney can adequately protect client confidences or 
alternatively whether the client can waive his or her right to confidentiality in an 
informed manner, or at all, in this setting;88 and (4) whether an attorney can competently 
represent a client in this manner.89 If after grappling with these concerns a jurisdiction 
decides to allow electronic representations, the jurisdiction must decide what precautions 
to require an attorney to take to deal with these issues and protect consumers in the best 
manner possible.  Furthermore, it is very possible that different jurisdictions will place 
 
conflicts check prior to reviewing the legal question.”); Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 98-6 
(stating that “in the course of an interaction with any person on the Internet an attorney/client relationship 
may begin with all that such relationship implies including creation of potential conflicts of interest (see 
Rules 1.7 and 1.9”); S.C. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 94-27 (stating that in an electronic representation 
the “attorney must obtain sufficient information to identify his client in order to make a complete conflicts 
inquiry”); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 97-10 (stating that an attorney 
“[a]dvertising and [communicating] over the Internet . . may be unable to screen for potential conflicts as 
required by Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10”). 
88 See Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 97-04 at 4 (stating that attorneys probably should not 
respond to specific legal questions posted in “chat rooms” or “news groups” because, in part, of “the 
possibility of disclosing confidential information (in violation of ER 1.6”); D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 
302 (stating that an attorney engaging in an electronic representation of a client “must also safeguard the 
secrets and confidences of that client under Rule 1.6” which may require the attorney “even if a 
communication  begins as a public communication in a chat room or similar exchange service, . . . to 
reserve his or her communications for the eyes of a particular advice seeker only”); Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs 
on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-9 (1999) (stating that in a legal representation through e-mail the 
“confidences and secrets of the e-mail attachments must be protected under DR 4-101”); Phila. Bar Ass’n 
Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 98-6 (stating that “in the course of an interaction with any person on the 
Internet an attorney/client relationship may begin” which would include “expectations of confidentiality”); 
S.C. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 94-27 (stating that “the confidentiality requirements of Rule 1.6 are 
implicated by any confidential communication which occurs across electronic media, absent express waiver 
by the client”); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 97-10 (stating that in communicating 
with a client or prospective client over the Internet “it may be difficult to protect confidential 
communications under Rules 1.6 and 1.9”). 
89D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 302 (stating that in an electronic representation of a client an “attorney must 
ensure that such requirements as that of competence under D.C. Rule 1.1, diligence and zeal under Rule 1.3 
and adequate communication under Rule 1.4 are met); Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, 
Op. 99-9 (“In providing answers to e-mail questions a lawyer must act competently under DR 6-101(A).”); 
Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1791 (2003) (stating that with regard to a legal 
representation in which an attorney communicates with a client by e-mail without in-person meetings “[s]o 
long as the requisite information is given, received, analyzed and acted upon, the attorney has met his duty 
of competency.”).  See also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 1.2 cmt. 7 (2002) (stating that brief 
consultation with a client before rendering legal advice may be appropriate unless “the time allotted is 
insufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely.”); Lanctot, supra note 12, at 252-53 (exploring 
whether a lawyer can meet his or her duty of diligence under Model Rule 1.3 “when a lawyer gives a client 
specific legal advice, but does not volunteer additional information about other legal issues that might lurk 
beneath the surface”). 
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different requirements on attorneys when engaging in electronic representations of 
clients.90 
III. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF CHOICE OF LEGAL ETHICS LAW 
BY MODEL CODE AND MODEL RULES  
 
The American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) model ethics rules have gone from not 
addressing choice of ethics law at all to basing the choice of ethics law on the jurisdiction 
or jurisdictions where an attorney is licensed to basing the choice of ethics law on where 
the attorney’s conduct occurred or where the predominant effect of the attorney’s conduct 
arises.91 The following section discusses the history of the ABA’s treatment of choice of 
ethics law in attorney disciplinary actions, or lack thereof, first in the Model Code of 
Professional Conduct (“Model Code”) and then in subsequent versions of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”).  This history should help a reader 
appreciate why there is little case or administrative law discussing this issue and 
illuminate somewhat the current language of the Model Rule’s choice of law rule. 
A. Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Original 1983 Version of 
Model Rule 8.5 
 
The Model Code, which the ABA adopted in 1969,92 ignored inter-jurisdictional 
conflicts of ethics law and did not contain a rule addressing choice of ethics law.93 
However, this was understandable because conflicts among state ethical rules were 
minimal during the period of time in which the Model Code served as the basis for most 
 
90 See J.T. Westermeier, Ethics and the Internet, 17 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 267, 311 (2004) (stating that “[t]he 
variances among states and countries in ethical rules applicable to websites and electronic communications 
greatly complicates any analysis of ethical considerations” and that “there is little likelihood that uniformity 
on a multi-jurisdictional basis could be achieved”). 
91 See infra notes 93–127 and accompanying text. 
92 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 1.11, at 1-19 (3d ed. 2003).  
Although adopted in 1969, the Model Code was not to become effective until 1970.  Id. 
93 Ronald D. Rotunda & John S. Dzienkowski, Professional Responsibility:  A Student’s Guide 2005-2006 
1108 (2005) (noting that the Model Code had no counterpart to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5). 
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states’ regulation of attorney conduct.94 Soon after the ABA adopted the Model Code, 49 
states had adopted or taken significant steps toward adopting the Model Code in 
substantial part.95 Therefore, with considerable continuity existing between state’s 
ethical rules during this time , choice of ethics law was not a significant issue.96 
The original 1983 version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct also 
largely ignored choice of law issues.97 Model Rule 8.5, entitled “Jurisdiction,” simply 
dealt with a state’s disciplinary jurisdiction and stated:  “A lawyer admitted to practice in 
this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction although 
engaged in practice elsewhere.”98 Nevertheless, two comments to this version of Rule 
8.5 obliquely dealt with choice of law issues.  Comment 2 stated that if rules of 
 
94 See Hazard, supra note 92, § 1.11, at 1-18 (“Within a few years, the Code was officially adopted – by the 
courts, not merely by the bar associations – in virtually all American jurisdictions.”); Mary C. Daly, 
Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Practice – Is Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer, Or  
No Answer at All?, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 715, 747 (1995) (stating that “[n]o reason existed to think about 
amending the Code to address multijurisdictional conflicts since the professional standards were identical 
from state to state”).  However, while 49 states eventually adopted the original version of the Model Code, 
many states rejected or adopted substantially different amendments to the Code than those subsequently 
recommended by the ABA.  Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 56-57 (1986). 
95 Wolfram, supra note 94, at 56-57 (1986).  Wolfram notes that this number includes states where the 
Model Code “had received only unofficial state bar approval.”  Id. at 56 n. 45.  “Official versions of a 
revised Code were not adopted in Illinois and Maine, for example, until 1980.”  Id.  Furthermore, some 
states adopted the Model Code’s Disciplinary Rules and not its Ethical Considerations, while other states 
adopted the Ethical Considerations “as legally and enforceable norms.”  Hazard, supra note 92, § 1.11, at 
1-20.  See also Wolfram, supra note 94, at 56 (“Not at all states adopted all parts of the Code.  Several 
states omitted the Ethical Considerations.”).   
The Model Code contained three different types of statements:  “[B]road general ‘axiomatic’ 
principles (‘Canons’), aspirational and explanatory provisions (‘Ethical Considerations,’ referred to as 
‘ECs’), and black letter rules (‘disciplinary Rules,’ referred to as ‘DRs).”  Hazard, supra note 92, § 1.11, at 
1-20.  Wolfram notes that the Canons embodied “general concepts from which the Disciplinary Rules and 
Ethical Considerations derive,” the Disciplinary Rules were “directly prescriptive,” and the Ethical 
considerations were “‘aspirational in character’” and “may provide ‘interpretive guidance’” for courts or 
agencies attempting to construe a Disciplinary Rule.  Wolfram, supra note 94, at 58-59 (quoting the 
Preliminary Statement of the Model Code).  
96 See Daly, supra note 94, at 747 (stating that because “professional standards were identical from state to 
state . . . the number of conflict issues brought to the attention of courts, disciplinary bodies, and state bar 
associations was extremely small”). 
97 See Hazard, supra note 92, § 66.4 n.1, at 66-23 (“As originally promulgated in 1983, Model Rule 8.5 did 
not address the choice of law issue at all, leaving courts and disciplinary authorities to develop conflicts of 
law principles on a case-by-case basis.”). 
98 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (1983). 
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professional conduct in two states differed then “principles of conflicts of law may 
apply.”99 Comment 3 further stated that where a lawyer “is licensed to practice law in 
two jurisdictions which impose conflicting obligations, applicable rules of choice of law 
may govern the situation.”100 Consequently, Rule 8.5 and its comments largely were 
silent on which jurisdiction’s ethics law should apply to an attorney admitted to practice 
in one state but not admitted to the bar in another state in which the attorney rendered 
legal services.101 
B. 1993 Version of Model Rule 8.5 
In 1993, the ABA amended Model Rule 8.5.102 The title of the rule was changed 
to “Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law.”103 Section (b) dealing with choice of law 
issues was added104 while section (a) essentially contained the original language of the 
rule dealing with disciplinary jurisdiction.105 The purpose of section (b) was to subject 
any particular instance of attorney conduct to “one set of rules of professional 
conduct.”106 This section of the rule divided attorney conduct into that undertaken “in 
 
99 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 2 (1983). 
100 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 3 (1983). 
101 Cf. Daly, supra note 94, at 749 (stating that the original version of Model Rule 8.5 “is strikingly silent 
about a jurisdiction’s right to discipline a lawyer not admitted to the bar who nonetheless renders legal 
services within the jurisdiction.”). 
102 Hazard, supra note 92, § 66.2, at 66-5; Daly, supra note 94, at 756. 
103 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (1993). 
104 Hazard, supra note 92, § 66.2, at 66-5 (“The ABA amended Rule 8.5 in 1993 to add a new section (b) 
addressing choice of law issues that can arise in lawyer discipline cases.”). 
105 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (1993).  See also Daly, supra note 94, at 757 (“Subsection (a) of 
the new Model Rule 8.5 essentially [tracked] the language of the prior rule.”).  In the 1993 version of Rule 
8.5, subsection (a) stated: 
Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the 
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs.  A 
lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another 
jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted for the same conduct. 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(a) (1993). 
106 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 3 (1993).  See also Hazard, supra note 92, § 66.4 n.1, at 66-
23 (stating that the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b) was “designed to ensure that, generally speaking, 
only a single conduct standard will be applied, no matter which jurisdiction disciplines a respondent 
lawyer”). 
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connection with a proceeding in a court,” which was dealt with in subsection (b)(1), and 
“any other conduct,” which was dealt with in subsection (b)(2).107 
For attorney conduct in a court proceeding, the rule applied “the rules of the 
jurisdiction in which the court sits.”108 For all attorney conduct outside of court 
proceedings, the rule applied the ethical rules of the jurisdiction where the attorney was 
licensed to practice if the attorney was admitted in just one jurisdiction.109 If an attorney 
was licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction, the rule applied the ethical rules of 
the jurisdiction where “the lawyer principally practices.”110 However, if “particular 
conduct” of an attorney “clearly [had] its predominant effect in another jurisdiction in 
which the lawyer [was] licensed to practice the [ethics] rules of that jurisdiction” applied 
to such conduct.”111 
107 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b) (1993). 
108 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(1) (1993).  This was “unless the rules of the court [provided] 
otherwise.”  Id. One commentator described this portion of the rule as applying the “substance/procedure 
distinction” in making choice of law decisions “dealing with litigation conduct.”  Geoffrey J. Ritts, 
Professional Responsibility and the Conflict of Laws, 18 J. Legal Prof. 17, 87(1993). 
109 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2)(i) (1993). 
110 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1993). 
111 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1993).  One commentator has characterized this as a 
“harmonization” approach to making choice of law decisions that weighs the interests of the various 
jurisdictions and parties involved and attempts to accommodate those interests to the extent possible.  Ritts, 
supra note 108, at 85-86, 87.  See also id. at 70 (stating that “‘[h]armonization’ appears to allow for 
sensitive case-by-case analysis of conflicts problems in the ethics area–analysis that can be responsive to 
the interests of states as coequal sovereigns in a federal system, and also to the needs of individual lawyers 
who may have reasonable fear of being whipsawed between the inconsistent rules of the states”).  
 
In its entirety, the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b) stated: 
 
(b) Choice of Law.  In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of 
professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows: 
(1) for conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before which a lawyer has been 
admitted to practice (either generally or for the purposes of that proceeding), the rules to be 
applied shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the rules of the court 
provide otherwise; and  
(2) for any other conduct, 
(i) if the lawyer is licensed only in this jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall 
be the rules of this jurisdiction, and 
(ii) if the lawyer is licensed to practice in this and another jurisdiction, the rules  
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The rule did not define the terms “principally practices” or “predominant 
effect.”112 Comment 4 to the rule did state that the “predominant effect” exception was 
intended “to be a narrow one.”113 The comment went on to provide two examples of the 
application of that language.  The language would apply to the situation where an 
attorney admitted and principally practicing in State A, but also admitted in State B, 
“handled an acquisition by a company whose headquarters and operations were in State B 
of another, similar such company.”114 However, the language would not apply “if the 
lawyer handled an acquisition by a company whose headquarters and operations were in 
State A of a company whose headquarters and main operations were in State A, but 
which also had some operations in State B.”115 The comment did not address more 
difficult scenarios. 
Moreover, neither the language of this version of Rule 8.5 nor its comments dealt 
explicitly with which state’s ethics law would apply when a jurisdiction was prosecuting 
an attorney for conducting activity in a jurisdiction where the attorney was not admitted 
to practice.116 Presumably, in such situations, the law of the jurisdiction where the 
attorney was licensed to practice would apply, assuming he or she was licensed in only 
 
to be applied shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer 
principally practices; provided, however, that if particular conduct clearly has its 
predominant effect in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the 
rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that conduct. 
 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b) (1993). 
112 Daly, supra note 94, at 760 (“Although ‘principally practices’ and ‘predominant effect’ are the central 
concepts in subsection (b)(2), Model Rule 8.5 fails inexplicably to define them.”). 
113 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 4 (1993). 
114 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 4 (1993). 
115 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 4 (1993). 
116 See Hazard, supra note 92, § 66.4, at 66-8 (stating that under the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)  
“[o]utside of the litigation context, resolving the choice of professional responsibility rules is more 
difficult”). 
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one state.117 But this results seems counterintuitive when the attorney is being prosecuted 
for conduct that occurred in a different state, especially if the conduct concerned is 
prohibited in that state, but allowed in the licensing state.   
Similarly, the rule was unclear as to what state’s ethics rules would apply to the 
prelitigation conduct of an attorney.  The rule applies the ethics rules of the applicable 
court once a lawsuit is filed, but the rule is unclear as to whether that court’s ethics rules 
apply to the attorney’s conduct in representing the same client regarding the subject 
matter of the ultimate lawsuit prior to filing a complaint.118 Thus, the 1993 version of 
Rule 8.5 determined the law applicable to an attorney’s conduct largely according to the 
jurisdiction in which the attorney was admitted to practice law, but was fairly unclear 
about what jurisdiction’s ethics laws applied to out of court conduct when an attorney 
was licensed in more than one jurisdiction.  Furthermore, the rule left something of a gap 
as to what law applied to an attorney’s conduct prior to filing a lawsuit for a client. 
 
117 See Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 178 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D. Mass. 
2001) (stating that with regard to attorneys licensed by only one state, “the choice-of-law analysis is simply 
that the lawyer is always subject to the ethical obligations of the state that licensed him, regardless of where 
the conduct occurs”); Hazard, supra note 92, § 66.4, at 66-8 (stating that in a situation where an attorney is 
licensed only in State A and is representing a “client based in State A” in “a transaction related to property 
located in State B,” according to the 1993 version of Rule 8.5 “the lawyer is governed only by the rules of 
State A”). 
118 See Hazard, supra note 92, at 66-8 (stating that “Rule 8.5 does not directly address the issue of 
prelitigation conduct such as advertising or solicitation”); Daly, supra note 94, at 759 (noting that 
subsection (b)(1) of the 1993 version of Rule 8.5 “leaves unanswered the question [of] which jurisdiction’s 
profession standards apply to the lawyer’s conduct prior to the lawyer’s admission” either generally or pro 
hac vice only for the purposes of the specific lawsuit concerned).  “Subsection (b)(1) also ignores the 
possibility that a lawyer will undertake representation ‘in connection with a proceeding in a court’ without 
have been admitted either generally or pro hac vice.”  Id. at 760.  
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C. 2002 Version of Model Rule 8.5 
In August 2002, the ABA adopted amendments to the Model Rules recommended 
by its Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice.119 Among the amendments adopted 
were changes to Model Rule 8.5(b).120 The comments retain the stated purpose of 
applying “one set of rules of professional conduct” to “any particular conduct of an 
attorney.”121 The substance of subsection (b)(1), which originally dealt with conduct in 
court, stayed the same, applying the ethics rules of the jurisdiction where the proceeding 
concerned takes place, but its language was changed to apply to attorney conduct related 
to matters “pending before a tribunal”122 in order to cover alternative dispute resolution 
as well as court proceedings.123 Subsection (b)(2) dealing with “any other conduct” was 
changed to apply “the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred, or, 
if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that 
jurisdiction.”124 Again, the text of the rule, as well as its comments, leaves important 
language undefined, such as “conduct occurred” and “predominant effect.”  
In an apparent attempt to help fill one of the gaps left by the 1993 version of the 
rule, Comment 4 uses the “predominant effect” language of the rule to address the ethics 
 
119 ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice Statement, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp-
home.html (“On August 12, 2002, the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted all nine 
recommendations contained in the Commission’s Final Report.”). 
120 The ABA also added language to Model Rule 8.5(a), governing disciplinary jurisdiction, that gives a 
state explicit authority to discipline attorneys who provide legal services in that state without a license to 
practice in that state. This new language provided:  “A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also 
subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal 
services in this jurisdiction.”  Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(a) (2002). 
121 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 3 (2002). 
122 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(1) (2002). 
123 ABA Comm’n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Report with Recommendation to the 
House of Delegates 277 (Aug. 2001) (“Recognizing the increasing use of alternative dispute-resolution 
processes, the Commission has broadened a number of Rules that formerly applied to ‘courts’ to make 
them apply to ‘tribunals,’ which include binding arbitration and other methods of formally adjudicating the 
rights of parties.”). 
124 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002). 
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rules that apply to attorney conduct in representing a client before a lawsuit is filed or 
alternative dispute resolution is used.  The comment states that “[i]n the case of conduct 
of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such 
conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another 
jurisdiction.”125 
Furthermore, a safe harbor provision was added to subsection (b)(2) stating that a 
“lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of 
a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the 
lawyer’s conduct will occur.”126 Comment 5 to the rule explains that this safe harbor 
provision is to apply “[w]hen a lawyer’s conduct involves significant contacts with more 
than one jurisdiction” and it is not “clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer’s 
conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred.”127 
125 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 4 (2002). 
126 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).  In its entirety, the text of the 2002 version of Model 
Rule 8.5 states: 
 
(a) Disciplinary Authority.  A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to 
the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the attorney’s conduct occurs.  A 
lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this 
jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction.  A 
lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another 
jurisdiction for the same conduct. 
 (b) Choice of Law.  In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the 
rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows: 
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules 
of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide 
otherwise; and 
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s 
conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different 
jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct.  A lawyer shall 
not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction 
in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct 
will occur. 
 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (2002). 
127 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 cmt. 5 (2002). 
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Therefore, under the current version of Model Rule 2002 in order generally to determine 
the state ethics law to apply to an attorney representing a client in a jurisdiction where the 
attorney is not admitted, the new Rule 8.5 looks to the state where “the lawyer’s conduct 
occurred” or where the conduct’s “predominant effect” arises.  However, due to the safe 
harbor provision if it is unclear in which state the “predominant effect” of the attorney’s 
conduct arose, the applicable law is that of any jurisdiction where the attorney can 
plausibly argue he or she reasonably believed the predominant effect occurred.  
The current language of the rule leaves it unclear as to which jurisdiction’s ethics 
rules apply to electronic representations of clients.  To start, it is not clear where an 
attorney’s “conduct occurred” when he or she posts a reply in an Internet chat room, on 
an Internet bulletin board or responds to client e-mails, for example, from a computer in 
Ohio and the client receives these communications at a computer located in Virginia.  
The attorney’s conduct could be construed to occur in the attorney’s home state, Ohio, 
where he or she has an office because that is where the attorney is located when posting 
in the chat room or on the bulletin board or drafting and then sending the e-mail.    
Alternatively, the attorney’s conduct could be interpreted as occurring in the 
client’s jurisdiction, Virginia in this example, because that is where the advice 
presumably has an effect and where client acts on the advice.  It further seems that if the 
client acted upon the attorney’s advice in Virginia, Virginia would be where the 
“predominant effect” of the attorney’s conduct occurred.  However, under the safe harbor 
provision in the rule if the attorney can argue that he or she “reasonably believed” that the 
“predominant effect” of the electronic representation was in Ohio, Ohio’s ethics laws 
would apply.  Thus, due to the safe harbor, the current version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) 
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may end up, at least in the context of an attorney’s electronic representation of a client 
located in a different state, applying the ethics law of the state where the attorney is 
licensed, the same result that would have occurred under the 1993 version of the rule. 
 
IV. CASE LAW AND ETHICS OPINIONS AIDING IN INTERPRETING 
THE CURRENT LANGUAGE OF MODEL RULE 8.5(b)(2). 
 
Only a handful of cases and ethical opinions have interpreted the “principally 
practices” and “predominant effect” language from the 1993 version of Model Rule 
8.5(b)(2)(ii).128 Nevertheless, these cases and opinions indicate that when the attorney 
and client reside in different jurisdictions the “predominant effect” of an attorney’s 
conduct can be viewed as occurring in either the jurisdiction where the attorney’s office 
is located or the jurisdiction where the client resides depending on the facts involved.129 
128 A few other cases have used choice of ethics law rules with almost identical language to the 1993 
version  of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(i), which applies the ethics rules of the jurisdiction where the attorney is 
licensed to practice law if the attorney is licensed in only one jurisdiction.  See Philin Corp. v. Westhood, 
Inc, No. CV-04-1228-HU, 2005 WL 582695, at *10 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2005) (finding alternatively under 
Oregon choice of ethics law rule that because the attorney concerned was “apparently admitted only in 
Oregon,” Oregon law applied to motion to disqualify); Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & 
Poole, P.A., 178 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D. Mass. 2001) (“All five jurisdictions follow Model Rule 8.5 with 
respect to the treatment of lawyers licensed by only one state.  For such lawyers, the choice-of-law analysis 
is simply that the lawyer is always subject to the ethical obligations of the state that licensed him, 
regardless of where the conduct occurs.”); O’Brien v. Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Group, 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 645, 
2004 WL 304318, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004) (applying New York’s choice of ethics law rule and 
holding that New York ethics rules applied to whether attorney was precluded ethically from prosecuting 
constructive discharge case because it would require the attorney to divulge client secrets when attorney 
was only licensed to practice law in New York during time concerned).  A couple of cases also have used 
choice of ethics law rules with almost identical language to the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(1) 
which applies the ethical “rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits” to attorney conduct in court 
proceedings.  See Philin Corp, 2005 WL 582695, at **9-10 (applying ethics rules of the jurisdiction where 
it sits, Oregon, to conduct of attorney in lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of 
Oregon when considering motion to disqualify the attorney as counsel for the plaintiff); In re Gonzalez, 773 
A.2d 1026, 1029 (D.C. 2001) (holding that Virginia ethics law applied to conduct of attorney “in 
connection with a proceeding in a Virginia court” in  determining whether attorney should be disciplined 
for revealing client secrets). 
129 See infra notes 130–184 . 
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In re Complaint as to Conduct of Summer dealt with whether Idaho or Oregon 
ethics law applied to the conduct of an attorney licensed to practice in both states.130 An 
attorney had been found guilty of attempting grand theft by deception under Idaho law 
while representing a client pursuant to two separate automobile accidents.131 The client 
had been involved in an automobile accident in Idaho a little less than two weeks prior to 
an Oregon accident.132 In settling with the insurer of the other driver in the Idaho 
accident, the attorney had represented that his client had not been injured in the 
subsequent Oregon accident.133 Despite this, the attorney, one week after settling his 
client’s claim for the Idaho accident, sent a demand letter to the claims adjuster for the 
company whose driver was involved in the Oregon accident.134 In the letter, he stated 
that his client did not suffer any symptoms until after the second accident, and he 
attached some of the same medical records that he had submitted to the previous insurer 
in settling the claim for the Idaho accident.135 
The Supreme Court of Oregon first found that the attorney “principally 
[practiced] law in Idaho.”136 After becoming a member of the bars in both Oregon and 
Idaho, the attorney had “assumed a heavy caseload at a high volume personal injury law 
firm in Nampa, Idaho.”137 However, the attorney’s firm maintained an office in Oregon 
where the attorney occasionally worked.138 Moreover, in analyzing where the 
predominant effect of the attorney’s conduct occurred with regard to the Oregon accident 
 
130 105 P.3d 848, 849, 851 (Or. 2005). 
131 105 P.3d at 850, 851. 
132 105 P.3d at 850. 
133 105 P.3d at 850. 
134 105 P.3d at 850 & n.4 
135 105 P.3d at 850. 
136 105 P.3d at 851. 
137 105 P.3d at 850. 
138 105 P.3d at 850 n.3, 851. 
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representation, the court noted that while the company whose driver was involved in that 
accident was “principally an Idaho company, . . . its claims adjuster was located in 
Oregon.”139 Furthermore, the claims adjuster had obtained information about the 
accident from the attorney’s client in Oregon, and the claims adjuster in Oregon had been 
the first to receive the demand letter from the attorney.140 “It follows, then, that the 
effects of the [attorney’s] conduct were felt in both Oregon and Idaho.  It could be argued 
that the [attorney’s] acts had approximately equal impact in each jurisdiction.”141 
This, presumably, would have called for application of Idaho law because the 
court had already determined the attorney principally practiced in Idaho and the 
“predominant effect” of his conduct was not “clearly” in Oregon, as required under the 
1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) to apply the law of a jurisdiction other than the 
one where the attorney “principally practices.”  Furthermore, with the attorney’s primary 
office being located in Idaho and the party who the attorney’s representations potentially 
would have damaged potentially being located in Idaho, it seems that, of the two 
jurisdictions concerned, the largest effect from the attorney’s conduct would be in Idaho.  
However, the court noted that “the parties have litigated this proceeding as if the 
[attorney’s] acts had their predominant effect in Oregon. Where that conclusion is at least 
plausible, we will accept it and proceed accordingly by applying Oregon’s disciplinary 
rules.”142 
139 105 P.3d at 851. 
140 105 P.3d at 851.  After receiving the demand letter, the claims adjuster forwarded it to the company’s 
principal office in Idaho.  105 P.3d at 850 n.4. 
141 105 P.3d at 851. 
142 105 P.3d at 851-52.  Most likely whether the court applied Oregon or Idaho law would not have affected 
the outcome of the action because defrauding a potential litigant most likely would subject the attorney to 
discipline under the ethics laws of either jurisdiction. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1 (2003) (“In 
the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly :  (a) make a false statement of material 
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 In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Marks involved an attorney who was 
licensed to practice law in both Wisconsin and Michigan.143 However, he maintained an 
office only in Michigan and “75 percent of his practice [was] based in Michigan.”144 A
Wisconsin client retained the attorney to represent him in a personal injury action.145 The 
client’s wife had been killed and his daughter and granddaughter were injured in a 
Wisconsin automobile accident.146 The other driver involved in the accident was a 
Michigan resident.147 The client terminated the attorney’s representation after about a 
week.148 At this point, the attorney had already done substantial work on the case, but 
had not commenced a lawsuit.149 The parties’ retainer agreement stated that the attorney 
would be paid for legal services performed at an hourly rate plus expenses upon 
termination of the representation prior to resolution of the case.150 Despite this language, 
the attorney represented to two insurance companies that he maintained a lien in the 
amount of twenty-five percent (25%) of any settlement of the former client’s claims.151 
The client’s new attorney subsequently moved for a court order in Wisconsin state court 
declaring that the client’s former attorney was not entitled to any legal fees beyond the 
amount that he had originally invoiced the client and calculated at an hourly rate.152 The 
former attorney then filed a lawsuit in Michigan state court against the former client, the 
 
fact or law to a third person.”). The court noted that Idaho had also commenced disciplinary action against 
the attorney.  105 P.3d at 851. 
143 665 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Wis. 2003). 
144 665 N.W.2d at 838. 
145 665 N.W.2d at 838. 
146 665 N.W.2d at 838. 
147 665 N.W.2d at 838.   
148 665 N.W.2d at 839. 
149 665 N.W.2d at 839.  The court noted that the attorney had “contacted the district attorney’s office and 
the sheriff’s department, met with his clients, and began to prepare pleadings.”  Id. 
150 665 N.W.2d at 838-39. 
151 665 N.W.2d at 840.   
152 665 N.W.2d at 840.  The attorney initially indicated that the amount due to him pursuant to the language 
in the retainer agreement was a little over one thousand eight hundred dollars ($1,800).  665 N.W.2d at 839. 
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new attorney and the insurance companies “asserting a ‘charging lien,’” among other 
grounds.153 
Once the two actions were settled, the former client and his subsequent attorney 
filed a grievance in Wisconsin against the original attorney for representing to the 
insurers that he had a twenty-five percent (25%) lien on the proceeds of the client’s 
personal injury claims, for filing a complaint asserting breach of contract after the client 
had terminated the representation, and filing an amended complaint alleging that his bill 
had not been paid when the amount of the bill had already been tendered.154 The first 
ground was brought under both the Wisconsin and Michigan attorney ethics rules while 
the second and third grounds were brought only under the Michigan Rules of 
Professional Conduct.155 The referee who initially heard the action dismissed all grounds 
based wholly on Michigan ethics rules, leaving only the first ground based on Wisconsin 
ethics rules.156 
With regard to the first ground concerning the attorney’s representations that he 
was entitled to twenty-five percent (25%) of the proceeds of the client’s claims, the 
referee determined that the “predominant effect” of the attorney’s conduct “occurred in 
Wisconsin because it affected the Koivistos, who are Wisconsin residents.”157 Therefore, 
Wisconsin law applied to this ground.158 The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not 
expressly review this determination by the referee noting only that “[n]either party 
appears to dispute that the Wisconsin disciplinary rule was properly applied to this 
 
153 665 N.W.2d at 840.  The former attorney also alleged tortuous interference with a contract.  Id. 
154 665 N.W.2d at 842. 
155 665 N.W.2d at 842. 
156 665 N.W.2d at 842. 
157 665 N.W.2d at 842. 
158 665 N.W.2d at 842. 
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count.”159 The referee’s analysis apparently would determine that the predominant effect 
of an attorney’s conduct occurs in the jurisdiction where the client resides.  Another 
argument supporting the “predominant effect” occurring in Wisconsin, although not 
mentioned in the opinion, would be that a Wisconsin accident would have been at issue in 
any lawsuit filed on the client’s behalf.  However, in determining where the 
“predominant effect” of an attorney’s conduct occurred, the courts in both Marks and 
Summer appear to have weighed heavily where the clients resided.  This resulted in the 
courts applying the ethics law from the client’s jurisdiction to the attorney’s conduct, 
which incidentally also was the jurisdiction of the courts making the choice of law 
determination.   
Two New York ethics opinions have addressed to some extent the “principally 
practices” and “predominant effect” language in New York Code of Professional 
Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (“DR”) 1-105(B)(2)(b), which is almost identical to the 
1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii).160 In the first opinion, an attorney’s law firm 
 
159 665 N.W.2d at 842.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, did hold explicitly that the referee erred 
in dismissing the second and third grounds alleging violations of the Michigan Rules of Professional 
Conduct due to the attorney filing the lawsuit in Michigan.  665 N.W.2d at 845.  Applying Wisconsin’s 
choice of law rule, which is almost identical to the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b), the court held that 
under subsection (b)(1) of that rule Michigan’s ethics rules applied to the attorney’s conduct in filing and 
proceeding with the Michigan action because it was “conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court 
before which a lawyer has been authorized to appear.” 665 N.W.2d at 846.   
The court also found that under Wisconsin’s version of Model Rule 8.5(a), Wisconsin had 
disciplinary jurisdiction such that the Wisconsin’s Office of Lawyer Regulation could proceed with a 
complaint against an attorney licensed to practice in Wisconsin alleging violations of Michigan ethics rules 
in a proceeding in Michigan state court.  665 N.W.2d at 846. 
160 New York Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 1-105(B)(2) states that with regard to 
which jurisdiction’s ethics rules should be applied to attorney conduct not in connection with a proceeding 
in a court: 
 
a. If the lawyer is licensed to practice only in this state, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of 
this state, and  
b. If the lawyer is licensed to practice in this state and another jurisdiction, the rules to be applied 
shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices; provided, 
however, that if particular conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another jurisdiction in 
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had prepared immigration forms for a husband and wife and then submitted those forms 
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) office in New Jersey where the 
clients lived.161 Included among the documents submitted was a form by which the firm 
entered its appearance as the couple’s “attorney of record.”162 The husband and wife 
subsequently became involved in litigation, and the attorney sought information on how 
much of the wife’s file the law firm had to provide to the husband after he requested her 
complete file.163 
In a footnote, the ethics committee of the New York City Bar Association dealt 
with what jurisdiction’s law applied to this issue.164 The committee first noted that the 
attorney’s letterhead indicated that “the attorney’s firm maintained its practice of law in 
the State of New York.”165 Moreover, the committee emphasized that “all services 
rendered by the firm in this engagement were performed in or from New York,” although 
it recognized that the firm submitted the clients’ INS documents to the New Jersey 
immigration office.166 The committee concluded that the New York Code of Professional 
Responsibility governed the law firm’s “professional activities” because New York was 
the “state in which the firm maintains its practice and in which we assume the attorney 
and any others in the firm who worked on the engagement are admitted to practice.”167 
The committee presumably could have left the analysis there using New York’s DR 1-
 
which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that 
conduct. 
 
N.Y. Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 5-101(B)(2) (2003) (effective June 30, 1999).  
161 N.Y. City Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1999-07. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 N.Y. City Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1999-07 n.1. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
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105(B)(2)(a), which is almost identical to the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(i), 
dealing with the choice of ethics law when an attorney is licensed in only one 
jurisdiction.  Assuming that the attorneys that worked on the couple’s INS forms were 
only licensed to practice in New York, this provision would call for the application of 
New York’s ethics rules.168 
However, possibly due to the lack of information on whether any of the attorneys 
concerned were also licensed to practice in New Jersey and the fact that the firm 
submitted the INS forms in New Jersey, the committee went on to address the language 
in DR 1-105(B)(2)(b), which is almost identical to the 1993 version of Model Rule 
8.5(b)(2)(ii), dealing with the applicable jurisdiction’s ethics rules to use when an 
attorney is licensed in two states.  The committee stated that “[u]nder DR 1-105(B)(2), 
because the lawyer principally practices in New York, the New York rules would apply 
to his conduct in this instance.”169 The committee, though, did not go on to address 
whether or not the attorneys’ “conduct cleary [had] its predominant effect in another 
jurisdiction,”170 in this situation New Jersey.  Thus, the committee appears to have 
stopped its analysis halfway through the applicable choice of law provision.   
Arguably the law firm’s conduct clearly had its predominant effect in New Jersey 
where both clients lived and where the firm had filed INS documents on the clients’ 
behalf and entered an official appearance as the clients’ attorneys.  Alternatively, 
although not mentioning the “predominant effect” language, the opinion could be 
interpreted as implicitly determining that the “predominant effect” of the attorneys’ 
 
168 See N.Y. Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 5-101(B)(2)(a) (stating that “[i]f the lawyer is licensed to 
practice only in this state, the rule to be applied shall be the rules of this state”). 
169 Id. 
170 N.Y. Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 5-101(B)(2)(b) (2003). 
Copyright © 2006 by Michael W. Loudenslager 
40
conduct was in New York where the firm was located and where the attorneys prepared 
the legal documents involved in the INS representation.  This was also the jurisdiction 
where the client file concerned was located.  Under this view, the clients’ residence and 
the jurisdiction where the law firm submitted the documents would be of little 
consequence.  While perhaps constituting a misreading of the “predominant effect” 
language in the choice of law rule, this interpretation is at least consistent with an 
application of the entire test set out in New York’s DR 1-105(B)(2)(b). 
In a second New York ethics opinion, an immigration law attorney licensed to 
practice in both New York and Illinois, but who practiced in Chicago, raised a conflict of 
interest issue concerning one former and one current client.171 After quoting New York’s 
DR 1-105(B)(2),172 the ethics committee of the New York State Bar Association 
concluded that Illinois ethics rules applied to the attorney’s conduct because “the 
jurisdiction in which the attorney principally practices [was] Illinois.”173 Perhaps more 
interestingly, the committee went on to state that even if the attorney had principally 
practiced in New York, the Illinois ethics rules would apply because the “particular 
conduct in the inquiry [had] its predominant effect in Illinois.”174 The opinion did not 
state explicitly what the specific “conduct in the inquiry” was, except for earlier noting 
that the attorney represented “individuals in immigration matters.”175 Assuming that the 
attorney’s conduct at issue dealt with an immigration representation in Illinois, the 
opinion can be interpreted as concluding that the “predominant effect” of such a 
 
171 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 750 (2001). 
172 The committee also noted that New York’s DR 1-105 is based on Model Rule 8.5.  N.Y. State Bar Ass’n 
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 750 n.1. 
173 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 750.    
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
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representation clearly would occur in Illinois, even if the attorney’s office was in New 
York.  This is a more accurate interpretation of this language than in the prior ethics 
opinion from the New York City Bar Association committee, and the opinion evidences a 
complete application of the test set out in DR 1-105(B)(2)(b), dealing with attorneys 
licensed in two states.176 
As evidenced by the cases and ethics opinions dealing with the terms 
“predominant effect” in the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii), a more deliberate 
and explicit application by courts and ethics committees of the test presented both in the 
1993 and current version of the model choice of ethics law rule is necessary to bring 
more predictability to this area.  However, the available authority illustrates some 
significant factors in determining where the “predominant effect” of an attorney’s 
conduct occurs.  While the courts in Summers and Marks ultimately acquiesced to the 
wishes of the parties and applied the law of the jurisdiction where the court sat,177 in both 
cases, this was the jurisdiction where the clients apparently lived and where the 
underlying accident occurred that was the reason for the attorney’s representation.178 So, 
the client’s residence and the location of underlying events causing the need for legal 
representation undoubtedly are important factors to consider in the “predominant effect” 
determination.  Additionally, the opinion of the New York State Bar Association ethics 
 
176 Two other recent New York ethics opinions note the possible existence of a choice of ethics law issue 
with regard to a particular attorney’s conduct without specifically resolving the issue.  See N.Y. State Bar 
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 768 (2003) (noting that “in the context of a federal government agency 
in which a lawyer may be rendering services beyond or outside the boundaries of this State, then the choice 
of law provisions of DR 1-105 may apply” but assuming “[f]or the purposes of this opinion” that “the New 
York Code of Professional Responsibility governs the conduct in question”); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. 
on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 742 (2001) (noting with regard to attorney licensed to practice in New York but 
employed overseas that “[w]hether the rules of professional conduct that would be applied are those of 
New York or some other jurisdiction depends on whether the lawyer is also admitted in another jurisdiction 
and, if so, the place where the lawyer ‘principally practices’ or where the lawyer’s conduct has its 
‘predominant effect’” and then applying New York ethics law to the attorney’s conduct without analysis). 
177 In re Summers, 105 P.3d at 851-52; In re Marks, 665 N.W.2d at 842. 
178 In re Summers, 105 P.3d at 850; In re Marks, 665 N.W.2d at 838. 
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committee apparently placed importance on the location of the court or agency office 
before which the attorney represented the client.179 So, this also is a potentially 
significant factor.180 
Nevertheless, the ethics opinion from the New York City Bar ethics committee 
would give an attorney grounds for arguing that where the attorney conducted the actual 
legal work, in other words physically drafted documents and conducted research 
concerned in the representation, is a factor in the “predominant effect” analysis.181 
Furthermore, the Summers case also considered the location of an opposing party and 
where an opposing party’s claims adjuster collected information regarding the accident 
underlying the potential litigation.182 
The New York City ethics committee’s  interpretation of the “predominant” effect 
language, as well as the additional factors considered in Summer, are potentially 
problematic especially considering the safe harbor language included in the 2002 version 
of Model Rule 8.5(b).  The safe harbor language states that an attorney will not be subject 
to discipline if his or her conduct “conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur.”183 
Given the current sparseness of authority on where the “predominant effect” of an 
attorney’s conduct occurs, the opinion of the New York City ethics committee and 
Summers provide an attorney with grounds to argue that he or she reasonably believed 
 
179 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 750 (stating that even if an immigration law attorney 
had principally practiced in New York the “particular conduct in the inquiry [had] its predominant effect in 
Illinois); supra notes 174–176 and accompanying text (analyzing this part of the ethics opinion). 
180 Obviously, this factor would be less helpful, if not completely irrelevant, if a transactional representation 
was involved. 
181 See supra notes 166, 169–170 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the conclusion by 
the New York City Bar’s ethics committee that New York ethics law applied to a New York City law 
firm’s representation of a New Jersey couple in an immigration matter). 
182 105 P.3d at 851. 
183 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002). 
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that the “predominant effect” of any representation involving multiple jurisdictions 
occurred in his or her home jurisdiction where the attorney’s office is physically located 
and where he or she actually drafted documents, conducted research or investigated the 
legal matter concerned.  This argument might especially be persuasive when an electronic 
representation is involved and the attorney never leaves his or her office in representing 
the client, despite the fact that the client that feels the consequences of the representation 
is located in a different jurisdiction and that where the attorney drafted documents or 
conducted legal research has little to no relevance to where the effect of the 
representation is felt.  As explained below, this outcome likely invalidates the current 
version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) under dormant commerce clause principles when applied 
to attorney Internet representations.184 
V.  THE DORMANT ASPECT OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The dormant commerce clause is an implicit facet of the Commerce Clause  
in the United States Constitution.185 Because the Commerce Clause gives the United 
States Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states,186 state governments, 
under the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause, cannot inhibit or frustrate trade 
between states through legislation, even in the absence of Congressional legislation.187 
184 See infra Section VII. C. 
185 Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 193.     
186 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes.”). 
187 Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 193, 208.  The Commerce Clause arose from the recognized need for the 
national government to have the ability to promote trade between the states after the nation’s experience 
with the Articles of Confederation when states erected internal trade barriers through taxes and duties.  See 
Granholm v. Head, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1895 (2005) (stating that the dormant commerce clause “‘reflect[s] a 
central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention:  the 
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic 
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles 
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This power to promote trade between the states, however, is balanced against the 
federalist system of government created in the Constitution where states and their citizens 
retained powers not expressly given to the federal government.188 For example, states 
possess “police powers” allowing them to “regulate activities affecting the health, safety, 
security and general welfare of their residents.”189 Assuming a state is not attempting to 
further an improper purpose,190 the basic question in a dormant commerce clause analysis 
is whether state legislation inhibits interstate commerce to such an extent that the state’s 
interest should give way to the national interest in promoting trade between the states.191 
of Confederation.’”) (alteration original)(quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979)); 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (“Under the Articles of Confederation, state taxes 
and duties hindered and suppressed interstate commerce; the Framers intended the Commerce Clause as a 
cure for these structural ills.”); Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 208 (“The Commerce Clause was written in 
order to avoid the ‘Balkanization’ of the United States economy that resulted after the institution of Articles 
of Confederation.”). 
188 See U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited to it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
189 Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 209.  See also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (“As long as a 
State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to ‘place itself in a position of economic 
isolation,’ it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the 
integrity of its natural resources.”) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)); H.P. 
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949) (recognizing “the broad power in the State to 
protect its inhabitants against the perils to health or safety, fraudulent traders and highway hazards even by 
use of measures which bear adversely upon interstate commerce”); Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More 
Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause:  A Propose Unitary Framework, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 395, 
418 n.102 (1998) (“The Court has long recognized the idea that states have an inherent ‘police power’ that 
allows them to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.”). 
190 Courts have recognized the intent to discriminate against interstate commerce as an improper purpose of 
state legislation under the dormant commerce clause.  See Granholm v. Head, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1895 (2005) 
(“States may not enact laws that burden out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive 
advantage to in-state busineses.”); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 
573, 579 (1986) (“When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or 
when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck 
down the statute without further inquiry.”); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935) 
(“Neither the power to tax nor the police power may be used by the state of destination with the aim and 
effect of establishing an economic barrier against competition with the products of another state or the 
labor its residents.”).  If a court can infer that the state had such an intent in enacting legislation, this 
constitutes a “per se” violation of the dormant commerce clause. Lawrence, supra note 189, at 426; 
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 214.  
191 Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws 145 (2d ed. 1995) (“[T]he commerce clause has caused courts to 
balance the forum’s concededly legitimate interest against the needs of the interstate commercial system” 
and “compares an existing local interest to the interests of other states.”); Lawrence, supra note 189, at 410 
(“[T]he resolution of a particular case today will turn in large part on a consideration of the local (state) 
interests in regulating local affairs as it relates to the national interest in promoting interstate commerce.”).  
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 Therefore, the United States Supreme Court under its modern dormant commerce 
clause test balances the benefits of the state regulation against the burden that such 
regulation places on interstate commerce.192 The test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 
states that even-handed or non-discriminatory regulations that promote “a legitimate local 
public interest . . . will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”193 Additionally, the Court has 
invalidated “state regulations that have the effect, intended or not, of regulating 
commerce that occurs ‘wholly outside of the State’s borders’ as per se violations of the 
Commerce Clause.”194 Finally, at times when analyzing state statutes under dormant 
commerce clause principles, the Supreme Court has examined whether the statute 
“adversely affects interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent 
regulations.”195 However, a close reading of the cases dealing with state regulation of the 
nation’s highway and railroad systems, the major context in which the Court has 
examined this concern, indicates that the Court still has used a Pike balancing analysis in 
these situations.196 
Brilmayer states that the Constitution’s “prohibition on overreaching essentially compels a state not to treat 
[a] person, business, or dispute as local when the state would prefer to do just that.”  Lea Brilmayer, supra,
at 134.  The Constitution prohibits such state overreaching because “a state may find it is in its interest to 
apply its law, or employ its judicial authority, in situations where it has no legitimate concern.”  Id. 
192 Loudenslager, supra note , at 213-214 (explaining the Supreme Court’s modern dormant commerce 
clause test).  “[T]he intrusive7 conduct that [the dormant commerce clause] prohibits is conduct that is too 
costly in its impact on out-of-state activity considering the limited domestic benefits it seeks to achieve.”  
Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 137.    
193 Pike v.  Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  “The commerce clause is violated when the state 
has a legitimate reason for regulating, but in doing so it imposes severe burdens on conduct in other states.”  
Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 136.   
194 Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 215 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) 
(plurality opinion)). For a more extensive discussion of Supreme Court cases using this test, see generally 
Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 215-19. 
195 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88-89 (1987). 
196 Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 219-20.  See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 
(1978) (“Our recent decisions make clear that the inquiry necessarily involves a sensitive consideration of 
the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the 
course of interstate commerce.”); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945) (“[T]he matters for 
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Several commentators have recognized the relevance of the dormant commerce 
clause principles to conflicts of law analysis.197 Both conflicts of law and dormant 
commerce clause principles compare competing state interests and analyze when the 
application of a jurisdiction’s substantive law is appropriate,198 and both ultimately are 
concerned with how the various sovereign states in the American federalist structure of 
government relate to one another, especially with regard to facilitating commerce 
between states.199 Thus, it is natural to examine the limits that the dormant Commerce 
Clause puts on the choice of law decisions of states. 
 
ultimate determination here are the nature and extent of the burden which the state regulation of interstate 
trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce and . . . the relative weights of the state 
and national interests involved.”).  For an extensive discussion of the Supreme Court’s “transportation 
cases,” see Loudenslager, supra note7 , at 219-226. 
197 See Brilmayer, supra note191 , at 136-37, 144-48, 158-59 (discussing the limitations that the Commerce 
Clause puts on the application of state substantive law to interstate activity); Louise Weinberg, Choosing 
Law:  The Limitations Debates, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 683, 690, 713-715 (discussing dormant commerce 
clause cases “bearing on extraterritorial applications of forum law when the forum may have only a 
‘fractional interest’ in applying its law”); P. John Kozyris, Some Observations on State Regulation of 
Multistate Takeovers—Controlling Choice of Law Through the Commerce Clause, 14 Del. J. Corp. L. 499, 
505 (1989) (discussing under dormant commerce clause principles “the extent to which states other than the 
state of incorporation may apply their laws to the transfer of control of multistate corporations which have 
some local contacts” and “the scope of state authority to regulate multistate transactions in securities”); 
Harold W. Horowitz, Comment, The Commerce Clause as  Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 
Harv. L. Rev. 806, 824 (1971) (discussing how the “[r]ecognition of the commerce clause as a limitation on 
state choice-of-law doctrine” serves “the federal interest in promoting uniform and unburdensome patterns 
of regulation”). 
198 See Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 147 (stating that the dormant commerce clause analysis identifies the 
forum’s interests and “explicitly considers the interest of the other states as well and forms a comparative 
judgment” in determining “how much of the statute’s effect is legitimate and how much of it cannot be 
justified by a legitimate forum interest.”). 
199 See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 6 cmt. e (1971) (“Probably the most important function 
of choice of law rules is to make the interstate and international systems work well. Choice-of-law rules, 
among other things, should seek to further harmonious relations between states and to facilitate commercial 
intercourse between them.”).  
Professor Brilmayer states that “perhaps the most obvious benefits” of states joining with other 
states in a federal government “are the increased commercial prospects integration offers.” Brilmayer, 
supra note 191, at 131.  “One purpose of federalism was to establish a ‘common market’ nationwide, in 
which the products in one state would not be discriminated against in others.”  Id.  “When one thinks of 
protection from discrimination against the business interests of other states, the constitutional provision that 
immediately comes to mind is the commerce clause.” Id. at 132.  See also supra note 187, and authorities 
cited therein (discussing the purpose of the Commerce Clause to promote trade between states and prevent 
states from erecting internal trade barriers).  “Whether the subject is people, business, or legal decisions, it 
is clear that one of the primary themes in constitutional law of interstate relations is achieving the benefits 
of mutual cooperation on the basis of state lines.” Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 132.  
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However, while the various conflicts of law regimes seek to decide which single 
jurisdiction’s law is most appropriate to apply to the activities of a particular actor, 
dormant commerce clause principles seek to determine only whether the application of a 
state’s law fails to meet the minimum thresholds required under the Constitution.200 
Therefore, under the dormant commerce clause, at least in theory, it is possible that the 
application of several states’ laws may be appropriate.201 The dormant commerce clause 
analysis then would allow a conflicts of law regime to determine which particular 
jurisdiction’s law, out of those that pass Constitutional muster, most appropriately should 
control the rights of parties in specific circumstances. 
 
VI. APPLICATION OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE TO STATE     
REGULATION OF THE INTERNET   
 
A. Case Law Applying Dormant Commerce Clause to State Regulation of 
Internet Activity 
 
Cases analyzing state regulation of Internet activity under the dormant commerce 
clause mainly have dealt with two different types of state statutes.  The first type of 
statute criminalizes knowingly posting material on the Internet that would be “harmful to 
minors.”202 These statutes often can be construed to hold the operator of a Web site 
 
200 See Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 164 (stating that one of the manners in which constitutional 
determinations are different from traditional conflicts state choice of law determinations is that 
constitutional determinations “impose a minimal threshold rather than singling out one state’s law as the 
best.”); Horowitz, supra note 197, at 824 (describing “the commerce clause as a limitation on state choice-
of-law doctrine”).  The federal constitutional standard “is a minimal rather than an ideal test.” Brilmayer, 
supra note 191, at 165.  
201 See Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 165 (“[C]urrent constitutional doctrine asks only whether a state might 
reasonably find that it has interest or that application of its law is fair.  A state need not have a greater 
interest than other states, . . . It need only make a decision that falls within reasonable limits.”).  Thus, it is 
possible in any given circumstance that more than one state might reasonably have an interest in regulating 
an activity.  
202 See, e.g., PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2004) (invalidating under the dormant 
commerce clause a Virginia statute making it unlawful to “knowingly display for commercial purposes in a 
manner whereby juveniles may examine or peruse” images or an “electronic file or message containing an 
image” or an “electronic file or message containing words or sound recording” depicting or describing 
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criminally liable simply for making such material available on a Web site whether or not 
the operator was aware of specific instances when minors accessed such material.203 
Courts overwhelmingly have held that such statutes violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause.204 The second type of statute criminalizes the use of the Internet to intentionally 
“lure,” “seduce” or “solicit” minors into engaging in sexual activity with an adult.205 
“sexually explicit nudity or sexual conduct” that “is harmful to juveniles”); Am. Bookseller Found. v. 
Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause 
Vermont statute prohibiting the use of the Internet to distribute to minors sexually explicit materials 
“harmful to minors”); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that statute 
prohibiting dissemination of materials harmful to minors by computer was unconstitutional under the 
dormant commerce clause); Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(invalidating under the dormant commerce clause a New York statute making it a felony to “intentionally [] 
use any computer communication system” to communicate to a minor material of a sexual nature “which is 
harmful to minors”) (alteration in original).  One commentator has termed these laws “dissemination 
statutes.”  Chin Pann, iBrief, The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Regulation of the Internet:  Are 
Laws Protecting Minors from Sexual Predators Constitutionally Different Than Those Protecting Minors 
from Sexually Explicit Materials?, 2005 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 8, ¶ 1, 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2005DLTR0008.pdf. 
In defining “harmful to minors,” these statutes often rely on the United States Supreme Court’s 
First Amendment obscenity test and require that the material: (1) predominantly appeals to the prurient 
interest of minors, (2) be patently offensive to the prevailing standards of the adult community, and (3) lack 
serious artistic, political and scientific value.  See, e.g., PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 231 (describing Virginia 
statute’s definition of “harmful to juveniles”); Am. Booksellers Found, 342 F.3d at 100 n.1 (setting out 
Vermont statutes “[h]armful to minors” definition); Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 163 (describing 
New York statute’s definition of “harmful to minors”). 
203 See PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 235 (explaining that publishers on the Web generally make their material 
“publicly available to users around the world, regardless of age, and lack any practical or reliable means for 
preventing minors from gaining access to the information on their sites or for verifying the true age of users 
of their Web sites”) (quoting district court opinion); Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 100 (stating that 
the terms of the Vermont statute at issue “can be easily read to apply to material placed on a website or 
shared with an e-mail or internet discussion group”); Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 168 (stating that 
under the New York statute at issue a web site operator might be subject to “regulation by states that the 
actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being accessed” and was not limited to 
“person-to-person” communications). See also Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 254 (explaining that by 
interpreting broadly the New York statute at issue in Am. Libraries Ass’n, it “could reach a person or entity 
that simply intended to post or communicate the material considered ‘harmful to minors’ and did not intend  
for such material to reach a minor”).  
204 See infra notes 209–217 and accompanying text (explaining main grounds courts have used to invalidate 
statutes criminalizing posting of material harmful to minors on the Internet). 
205 See, e.g., Hatch v. Super. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (examining California 
statute making it a felony for a person to use the Internet to distribute “any harmful matter to a minor” 
knowing that a minor is receiving the matter with the intent of arousing or appealing to the “passions or 
sexual desires of that person or of a minor” and with the purpose or intent of seducing a minor); Cashatt v. 
State, 873 So. 2d 430, 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (analyzing Florida statute making it a felony for a 
person to “knowingly” use the Internet “to seduce, solicit, lure, or entice,” or to attempt any of these with, 
“a child or another person believed by the person  to be a child, to commit any act . . . relating to sexual 
battery; . . . lewdness and indecent exposure;” or “child abuse”); People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 127 
(N.Y. 2000) (scrutinizing New York statute prohibiting “disseminating indecent material to minors” in 
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These cases often involve an adult initially communicating with a police officer posing as 
a minor in an Internet chat room or bulletin board and engaging in sexually explicit 
discussions with the supposed minor.206 Often the adult attempts to meet the intended 
minor victim in person for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity.207 Courts 
 
order “to importune[], invite[] or induce[] a minor to engage in” sexual activity); State v. Snyder, 2003-
Ohio-6399, ¶ 7, 801 N.E.2d 876, 880-81 (Ohio Ct. App.) (examining Ohio statute prohibiting use of the 
Internet to “solicit” another person “to engage in sexual activity” when the solicitor is an adult and 
“believes that the other person is thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age”). 
 Although not nearly as prevalent as the two contexts mentioned in the text, a few courts have also 
dealt with whether state regulation of e-mail violates the dormant commerce clause.  See Ferguson v. 
Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 260, 264-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a California 
statute regulating “conduct by persons or entities doing business in California who transmit unsolicited 
advertising materials” through electronic mail and fax machines was valid under the dormant commerce 
clause); MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., Cv. No. 248514, 2004 WL 3141311, at *6 (Md. Cir. 
Ct. Dec. 3, 2004) (holding Maryland statute regulating electronic mail was invalid under the dormant 
commerce clause because it did not “provide the email must be received in Maryland, instead the statute 
pertains to situations where an email sender in one states [sic] sends an email to a Maryland resident living 
or working in another state” and therefore the statute sought “to regulate the transmission of commercial 
email between persons in states outside of Maryland, even when the email never enters Maryland”); State 
v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 407, 409-13 (Wash. 2001) (upholding under the dormant commerce clause a 
Washington statute that prohibited “sending a commercial e-mail message from a computer located in 
Washington or to an e-mail address held by a Washington resident” that misrepresented or disguised “the 
message’s point of origin or transmission path or [used] a misleading subject line”).  Another court also has 
held that the application of a state’s motor vehicle code to a car manufacturer’s use of a Web site to sell 
cars in that state did not violate the dormant commerce clause.  Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 
264 F.3d 493, 505 (5th Cir. 2001).    
206 See, e.g., Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460-61 (setting out the Internet communications between the 
defendant and a woman posing as two different thirteen year-old girls); Cashatt, 873 So. 2d at 433 
(providing details concerning defendant’s Internet communications with a police officer posing as a 
fourteen year-old boy “by means of a ‘bulletin board’ posting and ensuing e-mail messages”); State v. 
Backlund, 2003 ND 184, ¶ 2, 672 N.W.2d 431, 433 (describing Internet chat room communications 
between defendant and a police officer posing as a fourteen year-old girl); State v. Bolden, 2004-Ohio-
2315, ¶¶ 5-6, 2004 WL 1043317 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.) (summarizing communications between defendant 
and a police officer posing as a fifteen year-old girl in an Internet chat room).   
One commentator has described the crimes that these statutes proscribe as “‘Internet luring’ or 
‘enticement.’”  Julie Sorenson Stanger, Comment, Salvaging States’ Rights to Protect Children from 
Internet Predation:  State Power to Regulate Internet Activity Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 2005 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 191, 192.  See also Pann, supra note202 , at ¶ 1 (describing such laws as “luring statutes”).  
“Such a crime is patterned after the traditional crimes of solicitation and attempt but specifically addresses 
the sexual solicitation of a minor over the Internet.”   Stanger, supra, at 192.     
207 See, e.g., Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462 (defendant met with woman posing as thirteen year-old at a 
hotel pool); Cashatt, 873 So. 2d at 433 (defendant arranged to meet with supposed boy and “showed up at 
the meeting place at the time agreed upon”); Backlund, 2003 ND 184, ¶ 2, 672 N.W.2d at 433 (defendant 
arranged to meet with police officer posing as a fourteen year-old girl at a convenience store where the 
defendant ultimately was arrested); Snyder, 2003-Ohio-6399, ¶ 4, 801 N.E.2d at 880 (defendant and police 
officer posing as a fourteen year-old girl arranged to meet at a restaurant where defendant was arrested). 
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overwhelming have held that these statutes do not violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause.208 
In dealing with the first category of statutes that hold Web site operators liable for 
making harmful material available to minors on the Internet, courts have used three main 
grounds to invalidate such statutes under the Commerce Clause.  First, courts have 
asserted that such statutes project a state’s legislative regime outside of the state by 
affecting operators of Web sites who are physically located outside of the state and who 
may or may not have people from within the state visit their Web site.209 Therefore, the 
legislation affects commerce that occurs outside of the state or, in other words, operates 
extraterritorially.  The site operator must comply with another state’s statute to avoid 
criminal prosecution despite being physically located in a different state whether or not 
residents of the other state actually visit the site.210 Second, using the Pike balancing test, 
 
208 See infra notes 222–231 and accompanying text (explaining analysis of courts holding that statutes 
preventing use of Internet to seduce or lure minors into engaging in sexual activity do not violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause).   
Some commentators have noted that the opinions invalidating statutes criminalizing the posting of 
material harmful to minors on the Internet largely have come from federal courts while the cases holding 
constitutional the statutes prohibiting the use of the Internet to lure minors into sexual activity with an adult 
are from state courts.  Pann, supra note 202, at ¶¶ 2-3 (explaining that this likely has occurred because “a 
multitude of interested parties seeking to protect their speech” initiated the cases dealing with 
“dissemination statutes” in federal court as “preemptive requests for injunctions” while state authorities 
brought the criminal charges against the defendants who challenged the “luring statutes”); Stanger, supra 
note 206, at 203, 211 (noting that “[a]lthough federal courts have not yet reviewed the validity of state 
Internet luring statutes, they have struck down other statutes intended to protect minors from sexually 
explicit and harmful Internet materials” while “state courts have consistently . . . upheld state police power 
to regulate Internet activity harmful to minors”). 
209 PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 240 (“Given the broad reach of the Internet, it is difficult to see how a blanket 
regulation of Internet material, such as [the Virginia statute at issue], can be construed to have only a local 
effect.”); Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 104 (“In practical effect, Vermont [through the statute at 
issue] ‘has ‘projected its legislation’ into other States, and directly regulated commerce therein,’ in 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.”) (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State 
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 584 (1986)); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding 
that the New Mexico statute at issue “represents an attempt to regulate interstate conduct occurring outside 
New Mexico’s border, and is accordingly a per se violation of the Commerce Clause”); Am. Libraries 
Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 177 (“New York has deliberately imposed its legislation on the Internet and, by 
doing so, projected its law into other states whose citizens use the Net.”) (citations omitted).   
210 See Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 177 (“The nature of the Internet makes it impossible to restrict 
the effects of the New York act to conduct occurring within New York . . . [C]onduct that may be legal in 
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courts have found that the burden placed on interstate commerce by such legislation 
outweighs its putative benefits.211 These cases, although recognizing that states have a 
legitimate interest in protecting minors from harm,212 have minimized the benefits of 
such a statute due to jurisdictional restraints that prevent a state from prosecuting 
operators of Web sites who physically are located outside of the state.213 
the state in which the user acts can subject the user to prosecution in New York and thus subordinate the 
user’s home state’s policy . . . to New York’s local concerns.”).  The Second Circuit described the effect of 
such legislation in the following manner: 
 
A person outside Vermont who posts information on a website or on an electronic discussion 
group cannot prevent people in Vermont from accessing the material.  If someone in Connecticut 
posts material for the intended benefit of other people in Connecticut, that person must assume 
that someone from Vermont may also view the material.  This means that those outside Vermont 
must comply with [the Vermont statute] or risk prosecution by Vermont.  Vermont has 
“project[ed]” [its statute] onto the rest of the nation. 
 
Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103. 
211 PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 240 (holding that the Virginia statute at issue “fails under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis of Pike v. Bruce Church”); ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1161 (“[U]nder the balancing 
test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc, the burdens on interstate commerce imposed by [the New Mexico statute 
at issue] exceed any local benefits conferred by the statute.”); Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 181 
(“The severe burden on interstate commerce resulting from the New York statute is not justifiable in light 
of the attenuated local benefits arising from it.”). 
212 PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 240 (“There is no question that Virginia has a compelling interest in protecting 
the physical and psychological well-being of minors.”); ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1161 (“We agree that the 
protection of minors from [harmful] materials is an undeniably compelling governmental interest.”); Am. 
Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 177 (“[T]he protection of children against pedophilia is a quintessentially 
legitimate state objective.”). 
213 PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 240 (noting that if the Virginia statue only reached intrastate communication, 
“it will have no local benefit given the vast number of other communication options available to a juvenile 
seeking them”); ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1162 (noting the “practical difficulties” of New Mexico prosecuting 
parties for violating the statute concerned “but whose only contact with [New Mexico] occurs via the 
Internet”) (alteration original) (quoting Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 178); Cyberspace Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 751 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (“[T]he [Michigan] Act will be wholly 
ineffective in achieving the asserted goal because nearly half of all Internet communications originate 
overseas.”), aff’d, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000); Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 178 (“The local 
benefits likely to result from the New York Act are not overwhelming.  The Act can have no effect on 
communications originating outside of the United States. . . . Further, in the present case, New York’s 
prosecution of parties from out of state who have allegedly violated the Act, but whose only contact with 
New York occurs via the Internet, is beset with practical difficulties, even if New York is able to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over such parties.”). 
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Third, some courts have gone beyond analysis of the particular statute at hand and 
asserted more broadly that only the federal government may regulate the Internet under 
dormant commerce clause principles.214 Courts generally have made this argument in the 
following manner.  The interstate nature of the Internet necessitates consistent treatment 
of Internet activity,215 and thus, to avoid inconsistent state regulatory regimes from 
“[paralyzing] the development of the Internet altogether” only federal Internet regulation 
is appropriate.216 Because Web site operators cannot cut off access to their sites from 
particular states, allowing states to regulate the Internet would require a Web site operator 
to comply with the most stringent state regulation that existed, which would inevitably 
stunt the growth of some types of commercial activity on the Internet.217 
214 Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 104 (“We think it likely that the internet will soon be seen as 
falling within the class of subjects that are protected from State regulation because they ‘imperatively 
demand[] a single uniform rule.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 
319 (1851)); ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1162 (“[C]ertain types of commerce have been recognized as requiring 
national regulation.  The Internet is surely such a medium.”) (citations omitted); Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 
F. Supp. at 181 (“The courts have long recognized that certain types of commerce demand consistent 
treatment and are therefore susceptible to regulation only on a national level.  The Internet represents one 
of those areas; effective regulation will require national, and more likely global cooperation.”). 
Some courts have described this effectively as a preemption argument.  Hatch v. Sup. Ct., 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 453, 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“Pataki’s [argument] . . . is sort of a preemption argument:  that 
logging on the Internet automatically places one beyond the reach of state criminal prosecution.”); People 
v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (describing this analysis as “essentially a preemption 
analysis”). 
215 Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that the Internet “requires 
a cohesive national scheme of regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine their obligations”). 
See also Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103 (“Because the internet does not recognize geographic 
boundaries, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a state to regulate internet activities without ‘project[ing] its 
legislation in to other States.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 334 
(1989)).   
216 Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  See also Cyberspace 
Commc’ns, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (“The [Michigan] Act, and other statutes like it, would subject the 
Internet to inconsistent regulations across the nation.  Information is a commodity and must flow freely.”). 
217 Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 183.  See also Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103 (“Although 
Vermont aims to protect only Vermont minors, the rest of the nation is forced to comply with its regulation 
or risk prosecution.”); Cyberspace Commc’ns, Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 751 (“A New York speaker must 
comply with the Act in order to avoid the risk of prosecution in Michigan even though (s)he does not intend 
his [or her] message to be read in Michigan.”).  This part of the third ground for invalidating statutes 
criminalizing the mere posting of material on the Internet appears to “double dip” because it uses the 
supposed extraterritorial reach of state regulation to argue for national regulation of the Internet.  Therefore, 
this actually is not a separate ground, as stated by these courts, but just a continuation of the argument for 
the first ground.  
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However, the cases that have made this sweeping argument ignore that the 
Supreme Court has still used the Pike balancing test in the major context in which the 
Court has mentioned the consistency of state regulation as a concern, the cases dealing 
with regulation of the United States’ highway and railway systems.218 Therefore, in the 
instances when the Court ultimately determined that state regulations of highway and 
railways were unconstitutional, this resulted from the burden created by compliance with 
the different regulations of several states outweighing the benefit derived by the states 
concerned from regulating the activity at issue.219 Cases setting out this argument also 
ignore that on Web sites that are more interactive, the site operator will have 
opportunities to learn the physical location of the site user.220 
Courts have held that the second category of statutes prohibiting adults from using 
the Internet to lure, seduce or solicit minors into engaging in sexual activity do not 
operate extraterritorially or overburden commerce.221 First, these courts have reasoned 
that these “luring” statutes regulate conduct that, at least partially, occurs within the 
prosecuting state.222 Generally, a defendant must commit at least part of a crime in a 
state in order to be subject to a state’s criminal jurisdiction.223 In determining whether a 
 
218 See supra note 196and accompanying text (discussing the ultimate test applied by the Supreme in the 
“transportation cases”).  See also Loudenslager, supra  note 7, at 250 (refuting the argument asserting the 
necessity of consistent Internet regulation as a grounds for invalidating state Internet regulations under the 
dormant commerce clause). 
219 See id. (“[T]he Court has tended to invalidate a state’s regulation of railways and highways when the 
regulation is widely out of step with most other states’ regulation of the subject matter, thus greatly raising 
the cost of compliance whit the regulation.”) 
220 See infra notes 238–240 and accompanying text (explaining how the interactivity of a Web site affects 
the potential burden of complying with different state regulations). 
221 See infra notes 222–231 and accompanying text (explaining reasoning of courts faced with “luring” 
Internet statutes for holding that such statutes do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause). 
222 See infra notes 223–227 and accompanying text (explaining courts’ reasoning that defendants having 
acted within the jurisdiction through Internet communications with residents). 
223 See People v. Hayne, No. F036401, 2002 WL 470853, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2002) (finding that 
the California “seducing” statute at issue “in the context of the [California] Penal Code as a whole, only 
penalizes acts that occur within the state”); Hatch v. Super. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 
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state has criminal jurisdiction over a defendant who communicated electronically with a 
state resident while physically located outside of the prosecuting state, several courts 
recently have held that the criminal conduct is not complete until “the offending words 
are heard by another person” or received electronically inside the state of prosecution.224 
Thus, the defendant acts, at least partially, in the prosecuting state when he or she 
intentionally transmits electronic communications to a minor located into the prosecuting 
state.225 Additionally, in many of these cases, the adult, in order to achieve his or her 
ultimate objective, needs to obtain information about the minor’s geographic location and 
often travels to the prosecuting state in order to meet the minor face-to-face.226 
2000) (stating that “the assumption that extraterritorial enforcement of state criminal statutes is normative 
is incorrect” and that in order to be subject to California’s criminal jurisdiction a person must have 
committed part of the crime within California); State v. Cunningham, 2004-Ohio-1935, ¶ 51, 808 N.E.2d 
488, 494 (Ohio Ct. App.) (“Ohio has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes that are partially committed in the 
state also where the object of the crime is located in Ohio.”). 
224 People v. Ruppenthal, 771 N.E.2d 1002, 1008 (Ill. Ct. App. 2002).  See also State v. Backlund, 2003 ND 
184, ¶¶ 9-10, 672 N.W.2d 431, 435-36 (quoting Ruppenthal and holding that “a person who, while outside 
of this state, solicits criminal action within this state and is thereafter found in this state” is subject to 
criminal jurisdiction); Commonwealth v. John, 2004 WL 1557622, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 12, 2004) 
(holding that a defendant who sent e-mail communications from Maryland and Delaware to a Pennsylvania 
police officer posing as a thirteen year-old girl made solicitations in Pennsylvania “where they were 
received”). 
 Courts have treated telephone communications in a similar manner.  See United States v. Pezzino, 
535 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that federal statute prohibiting the “transmission” of bets or 
wagers on sporting events over interstate communication facilities included both the “use of interstate 
facilities for sending or receiving wagering information.”); United States v. Synodinos, 218 F. Supp. 479, 
481 (D. Utah 1963) (holding that Utah was a proper venue for a prosecution for “transmission” of bets or 
wagers on sporting events over interstate facilities because “the District of Utah [was] where the use of the 
interstate wire facilities had its ultimate impact, i.e., it was here that the messages . . . were actually 
received”); State v. Meyers, 825 P.2d 1062, 1064-65 (Haw. 1992) (upholding conviction in Hawaii for 
terrorist-like-threats made by defendant located in California through a telephone call to a probation officer 
in Hawaii). 
225 See Cunningham, 2004-Ohio-1935, ¶ 57, 808 N.E.2d at 495 (finding Ohio’s criminal jurisdiction 
appropriate because, among other things, the defendant’s “intended victim was located in Ohio” and “the 
recipient of the Defendant’s Internet communications was located in Ohio, and the Defendant was given 
notice of this during the communications.”); John, 2004 WL 1557622, at *4 (“Certainly, a person who 
receives a criminal solicitation while sitting at her computer terminal in Pennsylvania is being solicited 
within this Commonwealth.”) 
226 See supra note 207 (providing examples of cases where the defendant attempted to meet the intended 
victim in person). 
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Therefore, courts have held that these “luring” statutes prosecute activity that occurs 
within that jurisdiction and do not operate extraterritorially.227 
Second, courts have found that the burden placed on interstate commerce by such 
statutes is very slight.  This is largely because these statutes do not regulate legitimate 
commerce.228 Moreover, the intent requirements of these statutes greatly reduce the 
number of electronic communications affected by the regulations.229 In order to be 
criminally liable, a defendant must intentionally send material to a known minor with the 
intent to seduce or lure the minor into engaging in sexual activity.230 Thus, courts have 
 
227 People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“When [the California statute at issue] is 
harmonized with the entire California penal scheme, it does not effectively regulate activities beyond 
California.”); Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 (“[T]here is no reason to suppose California would attempt to 
impose its policies on other states in light of the relevant California penal statutes covering jurisdiction over 
public offenses which generally bar punishment for wholly extraterritorial offenses”); Cunningham, 2004-
Ohio-1935, ¶ 57, 808 N.E.2d at 495 (holding that the defendant’s “over-extension and over-breadth 
arguments do not apply to this case”). 
228 E.g., Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“[N]o legitimate commerce is 
burdened by penalizing the transmission of harmful sexual material to known minors in order to seduce 
them.”); People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 127 (N.Y. 2000) (“We are hard pressed to ascertain any 
legitimate commerce that is derived from the intentional transmission of sexually graphic images to minors 
for the purpose of luring them into sexual activity.  Indeed, the conduct sought to be sanctioned by [the 
New York statute at issue] is of the sort that deserves no ‘economic’ protection.”); Backlund, 2003 ND 184, 
¶ 17, 672 N.W.2d at 438 (“[I]t is difficult to ascertain any legitimate commerce that is derived from the 
willful transmission of explicit or implicit sexual communications to a person believed to be a minor in 
order to willfully lure that person in to sexual activity.”). 
 One commentator has gone a step further and asserted that “luring a minor over the Internet” does 
not involve commerce at all, “and, as such, should not be subject to the dormant Commerce Clause 
blocking power.”  Stanger, supra note 206, at 220.  But see Pann, supra note 202, at ¶ 29 (stating that “the 
state courts have overstated their position when contending that no legitimate commerce is burdened, as 
states may have different policies on what conduct is prohibited”).  
229 People v. Hayne, No. F036401, 2002 WL 470853, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2002) (“[T]he intent to 
seduce requirement greatly narrows the scope of the law and its effect on interstate commerce.”); Hatch v. 
Super. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“While a ban on simple communication of 
certain materials may interfere with an adult’s legitimate rights, a ban on communication of specified 
matter to a minor for the purposes of seduction can only affect the rights of a very narrow class of adults 
who intend to engage in sex with minors.”); Cashatt, 873 So. 2d at 436 (“[T]he statute does not burden 
Internet users with inconsistent regulations because of the ‘intent to seduce’ element, which makes it much 
narrower that the statute invalidated by American Libraries Association.”); People v. Foley, 692 N.Y.S.2d 
248, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (noting that “[t]he inclusion of the second [‘luring’] prong [of the New 
York statute at issue] narrows its scope and lessens any burden on commerce”), aff’d, 731 N.E.2d 123 
(N.Y. 2000); Stanger, supra note 206, at 227 (“[L]uring statutes are unlikely to have any type of ‘chilling 
effect’ on Internet commerce because they proscribe only a narrow range of Internet activity.”) 
230 Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191 (“Only when material is disseminated to a known minor with the intent to 
arouse the prurient interest of the sender and/or minor and with the intent to seduce the minor does the 
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held that states’ compelling interest in protecting minors from harm outweighs the 
burden, if any, that these statutes place on interstate commerce.231 
B. Reconciling the Cases Dealing with State Regulation of the Internet 
According to the Degree of Anonymity and Interactivity of the Particular 
Internet Communication Affected by the Regulation at Issue  
 
The two main categories of cases examining state regulation of the  
Internet under the dormant commerce clause illustrate how the degree of anonymity 
between Web site users and operators affects the burden of complying with different state 
regulations.  The anonymity of Internet communications is one of the major 
characteristics of the operation of the Internet that can make compliance with different 
state regulations especially difficult.232 Often times, Internet users are unable to 
 
dissemination become a criminal act.”); State v. Bolden, 2004-Ohio-2315, ¶47, 2004 WL 1043317 at *7 
(Ohio Ct. App.) (explaining that the Ohio statute at issue “does not regulate the mere transmission of 
pictures, images, or messages that are deemed harmful to children” instead the statute “regulates the 
conduct of adults who seek to solicit minors to engage in sexual activity in conversations by means of the 
Internet.”) 
231 Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 (“[N]o rational analysis supports the proposition that [the California 
statute at issue] imposes any burden on interstate commerce.”); Cashatt, 873 So. 2d at 436 (“The effect of 
[the Florida statute at issue] on interstate commerce is incidental at best and is far outweighed by the state’s 
interest in preventing harm to minors.”); Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 127 (holding that the New York “luring” 
statute at issue was “a valid exercise of the State’s general police powers”); Bolden, 2004-Ohio-2315, ¶47, 
2004 WL 1043317 at *7 (holding that Ohio “soliciting” statute “[did] not unduly interfere with interstate 
commerce”). 
 A recent case used reasoning similar to the two arguments set out in the text above to hold 
constitutional under the Commerce Clause a California statute prohibiting the use of “an electronic 
communication device” to “willfully threaten [] to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily 
injury to another person.”  People v. Vijay, No. H024123, 2003 WL 23030492, at **6, 9-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Dec. 19, 2003) (alteration original).  The defendant had threatened the husband of an ex-girlfriend with 
bodily harm in an e-mail.  Vijay, 2003 WL 23030492, at **4-5.  The court found that: “California 
prosecutes only those criminal acts that occur wholly or partially within the state. . . . Thus, [the criminal 
threat statute at issue] cannot be enforced beyond that which is jurisdictionally allowed.”  Id. at *10.  
Furthermore, the court found that the intent requirement of the statute greatly narrowed the effect of the 
statute on Internet activity: “To violate [the statute] the offender must willfully threaten to commit a crime 
that would result in death or great bodily injury, and he must make the threat with the specific intent that 
the statement be taken as a threat.”  Id. The court stated that it could not “envision any legitimate 
commerce involving the sending of messages that threaten death or great bodily injury to the recipient such 
that that person is put in sustained fear for his or her own safety.”  Id. n.7.  
232 Transience is another significant characteristic of Internet communications that potentially makes 
compliance with different state regulations problematic.  Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 242.  Transience 
refers to “the almost infinite number of paths, through numerous states, that data can travel when two 
computers on the Internet communicate with one another.”  Id. Transience results from the distributed 
network and packet-switching technology used to transport computer data across the Internet.  Id. at 203-
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determine the physical location of the computers that facilitate Internet communications 
because the Domain Name System (“DNS”)233 and Universal Resource Locator 
(“URL”)234 used to tell computers where to retrieve or transport data do not necessarily 
correspond to any specific geographic location.235 Instead, the DNS and URL provide a 
hierarchical structure for computers to translate textual names into computer addresses.236 
Consequently, Web site operators are often unaware of the physical location of users of 
the site.237 
However, the degree of interactivity of the Internet communications involved 
determines how much anonymity ultimately will remain between users.  For example, 
operators of “passive” Web sites that simply “publish information which others can view 
 
04.  See also id. at 195-97 (providing a more in-depth explanation of the distributed network and packet-
switching technology used in Internet communications).   
However, two factors decrease the potential burden of transience.  First, a state has very little 
incentive to regulate activity when transient data travels through computers located in that state en route to 
an end recipient in another state because such activity “does not cause any practical effect in the first state.”  
Id. at 247.  “A state only has an incentive to regulate Internet communications that either originate or are 
received physically within the geographic boundaries of that state because those are the situations when the 
activity can cause harmful effects in that state.”  Id. at 247-48.  Second, criminal jurisdiction limits the 
ability of a state to enforce its regulations on the Internet.  Id. at 248.  Criminal jurisdiction requires that a 
defendant commit at least part of an offense within the prosecuting state.  Id. Moreover, in order to 
prosecute an individual, a state normally “would have to extradite a person located in another state.”  Id. 
“[E]xtradition from one state to another is limited to individuals who have fled the state that seeks 
extradition.”  Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 
Yale L.J. 785, 815 (2001).  “Thus, it seems very unlikely that ‘[a] Web site operator who has never had a 
presence in the regulating state’ would face prosecution there.”  Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 248 
(quoting Goldsmith & Sykes, supra, at 815).  See also id. at 247-49 (providing a more in-depth explanation 
of how the lack of a state incentive to regulate Internet activity involving transient computer data and 
criminal jurisdiction decrease the potential extraterritorial effect of state Internet regulations). 
233 Douglas E. Comer, Internetworking with TCP/IP:  Principles, Protocols, and Architectures 465 (4th ed. 
2000) (describing the “mechanism that implements a machine name hierarchy” for Internet computers to 
communicate with each other “is called the Domain Name System (DNS)”). 
234 Christos J.P. Moschovitis et al.,  History of the Internet 164 (1999) (stating that Universal Resource 
Locators are known as “URLs”).  
235 Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 204.  “Some authorities refer to the URL as the Uniform Resource 
Locator as opposed to the Universal Resource Locator.”  Id. at 202 n.71.  See also Shea v. Reno, 930 F. 
Supp. 916,  929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Joe Habraken, Absolute Beginner’s Guide to Networking 236 (3d ed. 
2001); Comer, supra note 233, at 528. 
236 Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 204.  For a more in-depth explanation of how computers transport 
computer data over the Internet and the World Wide Web, see id. at 198-203. 
237 Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 205 (“By itself, the transporting of computer data across the Web from a 
server to a computer using Web-browser software does not provide the site operator with any information 
about the location of the person using the Web browser.”). 
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on the site” and do nothing else will have little opportunity to learn of the physical 
location of users of the site.238 On the other hand, operators of more “interactive” Web 
sites that allow, or in some instances require, users to exchange information with the 
operator’s computer server have more ability to discover the user’s physical location.239 
Presumably, “[t]he more interactions that occur between the user and the Web site, the 
more opportunities the host or operator of the site has to obtain information from the user 
about the user’s physical location.”240 Similarly, people using electronic mail or 
communicating in a chat room will have the opportunity to communicate their physical 
location to one another.  Once an Internet user discovers another party’s physical 
location, the user can then either continue the communication concerned or cut it off if 
the user knows that the jurisdiction in which the other party is located prohibits the 
activity.  Without knowledge of the physical location of the other party, though, users 
have to comply with the most stringent state regulation that exists whether individuals 
located in that state are involved in the communication or not.  Therefore, the level of 
interactivity of the Internet communications concerned affect how burdensome 
compliance with different state Internet regulations can be.   
 
238 See id. See also Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) 
(describing a “passive Web site”  as a site “that does little more than make information available to those 
who are interested in it”). 
239 Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 205-06.   
 Additionally, when a Web site sells tangible goods, the operator will likely need to know the 
physical location of the site user in order to ship those goods to the user.  Id. at 206.  While this assumes 
that the shipping address corresponds to the physical location of the user, “the buyer [in most instances will 
have] every incentive to provide the host with accurate shipping information in order to receive the goods 
purchased.”  Id. However, this factor is less relevant to the current analysis because this article involves the 
provision of a service, specifically the giving of legal advice, over the Internet and not a tangible good.   
240 Id. 
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Consequently, the interactivity of the Internet communications governed by a 
particular state regulation is a key factor in reconciling the cases that have analyzed state 
regulation of Internet activity under the dormant commerce clause.241 The state Internet 
regulations that courts have invalidated under the dormant commerce clause potentially 
affected passive Internet activity.242 These statutes prohibited Web site operators from 
posting material on the Internet that would be “harmful to minors” and would have 
covered passive Web sites where operators or hosts just made information available to 
site users and had no additional contact with site users.243 
On the other hand, the state Internet regulations that courts have held past muster 
under the dormant Commerce Clause regulated more interactive Internet activity.244 
These statutes largely have prohibited the use of the Internet by adults to lure known 
minors into engaging in sexual activity with the adult.245 The activity affected by these 
statutes often involved the adult engaging in multiple communications over the Internet 
with the person believed to be a minor.246 In order to violate the statute, the adult had to 
discover from the other party that they were a minor.247 Moreover, due to the interactive 
nature of the activity involved, the potential defendant had the opportunity to discover the 
physical location of the target and also had an incentive to discover the physical location 
of the target in order to facilitate a face to face meeting.248 Thus, the dormant commerce 
clause case law to date has tended to invalidate state Internet regulations that affected 
 
241 Id. at 251-52, 254-55 (reconciling the Hatch and American Libraries Ass’n cases according to the 
interactivity of the Internet conduct affected by the statutes at issue in each case). 
242 Id. at 254 (analyzing the statute at issue in the American Libraries Ass’n case). 
243 Id. (analyzing the statute at issue in the American Libraries Ass’n case); supra notes – and 
accompanying text.. 
244 See id. (analyzing the statute at issue in the Hatch case). 
245 See supra notes 205 and accompanying text. 
246 See supra note 206and accompanying text. 
247 Loudenslager, supra note 7, at 251. 
248 See id. at 252; supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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passive Internet activity and to uphold regulations that dealt with more interactive 
Internet communications.  
 
VII.   DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ABA 
CHOICE OF ETHICS LAW RULE, MODEL RULE 8.5(b)(2), WHEN 
APPLIED TO E-LAWYERING 
 
Despite different descriptions in some of the case law, the dormant Commerce 
Clause test boils down to whether the burden placed on interstate commerce by the state 
regulation concerned outweighs the benefit to the state interest that the regulation 
promotes, unless the state regulation at issue discriminates against out-of-state actors on 
its face or a court can discern this was the purpose of the regulation.249 The current 
version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) would apply a state’s ethics law to all attorney conduct, 
by attorneys with offices located inside as well as outside of the state, that “occurred” or 
had its “predominant effect” within a state.250 Therefore, because this rule treats both 
resident and non-resident attorneys in the same manner, it is appropriate to apply the 
dormant commerce clause balancing test from Pike v. Bruce Church to examine the 
constitutionality of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) in the context of attorney representations of 
clients over the Internet.251 
The following hypothetical is included in order to provide a concrete example of a 
potential Internet representation of a client and to facilitate a more clear understanding of 
the interests, or lack thereof, of the various states that potentially could regulate and apply 
 
249 See supra notes 192–196 and accompanying text (explaining the basic dormant commerce clause test 
from Pike v. Bruce Church). 
250 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002). 
251 Cf. On Pet. for Review of Op. 475 of Advisory Comm. Prof’l Ethic & DR 2-102(c), 444 A.2d 1092, 1100 
(N.J. 1982) (holding that New Jersey restriction on use in firm names of names of attorneys not licensed to 
practice in New Jersey did not discriminate against interstate commerce because the restriction applied to 
both residents and non-residents who were not licensed to practice in New Jersey and applying the Pike v. 
Bruce Church balancing test to examine whether the regulation violated the dormant commerce clause). 
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their laws to an attorney’s electronic representation of a client.  An attorney with an 
office located in Cincinnati, Ohio has a practice that, among other areas, focuses on 
landlord-tenant and fair housing law.  The attorney is licensed to practice only in Ohio.  
In order to attract new clients, the attorney from time to time participates in Internet 
bulletin boards where people with questions about landlord-tenant and fair housing law 
post questions.  
A mother with three young children residing in Roanoke, Virginia recently was 
turned down after applying for a two bedroom apartment in a local apartment complex.  
The reason given by the manager of the apartment complex was that the mother would 
have exceeded the three person occupancy limit for that apartment.  The manager of the 
apartment complex explained that it has a policy of allowing only one more occupant 
than the number of bedrooms in each apartment.252 The mother posts a question setting 
out her situation on an Internet bulletin board dealing with landlord tenant law, asking 
whether the complex’s occupancy policy violates any laws, and asking whether there are 
any government offices that can help her.   
The Ohio attorney posts a reply to the mother’s initial post on the landlord-tenant 
Internet bulletin board and explains the process of lodging a complaint with the United 
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) as well as how 
complaints are lodged with most state agencies that deal with fair housing matters.  He 
also explain the process that HUD generally uses in processing such complaints.  He 
further states that it is possible that the apartment complex’s occupancy policy violates 
federal fair housing laws due to a disparate impact on families.  However, he explains 
 
252 Thus, a maximum of two occupants are allowed in one bedroom apartments, and three occupants are 
allowed in two bedroom apartments. 
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that he would need more information from the mother and would have to do some legal 
research in order to form a more definitive opinion.  The attorney includes the Web 
address of his firm Web site in his reply post in case the mother would like to discuss this 
matter further with him. 
The mother goes ahead and submits a housing discrimination complaint to HUD, 
but also decides to contact the attorney about potentially filing a lawsuit against the 
apartment complex.  The mother goes to the attorney’s Web site.  The attorney’s Web 
site describes his practice and qualifications.  The home page of the Web site also 
contains a link entitled, “What are my rights?”253 When a visitor to the Web site clicks 
on that link, he or she is then taken to another Web page entitled, “Wondering about a 
legal problem that you have?”  This page presents a client intake form to the visitor that 
asks for the visitor’s name, contact information (including e-mail address), a brief 
statement of the facts involved in the visitor’s legal problem, a listing of other parties or 
actors involved with the visitor’s legal problem, and any questions that the visitor has for 
the attorney about his or her legal problem.  The mother fills out the client intake form 
and clicks on the “Submit” button at the end of the intake form which sends her 
information to the attorney’s computer in Ohio.   
After receiving the potential client’s information through his Web site, the 
attorney runs a conflicts check, and then sends an e-mail to the mother, stating the terms 
of the representation, again stating his belief that the occupancy policy of the apartment 
complex probably violates fair housing laws and including an information packet for the 
client to fill out.  Upon receipt of the attorney’s e-mail, the mother located in Virginia 
 
253 Several characteristics of this Web site are based on a hypothetical presented in a California ethics 
opinion.  Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005). 
Copyright © 2006 by Michael W. Loudenslager 
63
fills out the information packet provided to her and then sends the packet back to the 
Ohio attorney as an attachment to an e-mail.  The attorney follows up on the information 
provided in the information packet by sending e-mail messages to the client, engaging in 
some legal research and eventually communicating the client’s position to HUD through 
a letter and several telephone calls before HUD reaches a resolution with the apartment 
complex.   
A. The Burden on E-Lawyering of Complying with Different State Ethical 
Regimes  
 
Electronic representations of clients involve interactive Internet communications 
that would decrease anonymity among the parties involved and decrease the burden of 
complying with differing state ethical rules with regard to such conduct.  As explained 
above, the anonymous nature of communications over the Internet is one of the major 
factors that burden Internet actors in complying with differing state regulations.254 
However, when Internet communications are more interactive, the ability to decrease 
anonymity among actors exists.255 Electronic representations of clients involve 
interactive communications between the attorney and client that allow the attorney to 
discover the client’s physical location and then comport his or her conduct to the ethical 
rules of that jurisdiction.  This is especially true when e-mail communications are 
involved as well as communications on Internet bulletin boards.  Some Internet bulletin 
boards even require that a user seeking legal advice indicate the jurisdiction in which they 
are located.256 Furthermore, an attorney providing a form on a Web site to facilitate 
client communication can adapt the form to require the client to indicate the jurisdiction 
 
254 See supra notes 232–237 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra notes 238–248 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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where he or she physically is located.  For example, in the hypothetical presented above, 
the attorney first had an opportunity to learn of the jurisdiction in which the mother lived, 
if he did not get this information from her initial post, when he posted a reply on the 
Internet bulletin board.  The attorney had a second opportunity to discover where the 
mother resided through the client intake form included on his firm Web site.   
While the example above did not involve contact between the attorney and client 
in a real-time Internet chat room, even in this context an attorney would have an 
opportunity to ask about the physical location of an individual who has asked a legal 
question.  Admittedly, an attorney in a real-time situation would have less time to discern 
the ethical requirements of the applicable jurisdiction in order to comply with them.  
However, an attorney that engages in chat room discussions on a regular basis could 
familiarize him or herself in advance with the jurisdictions that prohibit certain activity 
and cut off communications with individuals from those jurisdictions.  Moreover, an 
attorney involved in an electronic representation of a client in any context will need to 
know the client’s physical location in order to provide competent legal advice.  If the 
attorney does not have this information, he or she should not be providing legal advice.  
Consequently, anonymity is not a characteristic of electronic representations of clients, 
and therefore, one of the largest factors that create a burden on Internet actors complying 
with the regulatory regime of different states is not an issue in this context. 
Nevertheless, in electronic representations of clients, there is some burden placed 
on the attorney when the attorney has to ascertain and then comport his or activity with 
the ethical regulations of different jurisdictions, especially if some jurisdictions prohibit 
the attorney’s activity.  For example, in the hypothetical above, the attorney located in 
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Ohio would have to familiarize himself with both Ohio and Virginia’s legal ethics rules, 
ascertain whether or not either state prohibits electronic representations, and if not, 
whether either state imposes any special duties on attorneys that engage in such 
representations.  The attorney would also have to determine if Virginia’s ethics rules 
conflict with Ohio’s rules in any relevant aspect, and if so, then determine which state’s 
ethics laws should apply to his conduct.   
However, the burden faced by attorneys in such situations are much less 
significant than the heavy burdens faced, and noted by much of the case law dealing with 
state Internet regulation, by individuals operating passive web sites.  The interactivity of 
the Internet communications involved in e-lawyering prevents the attorney from having 
to comply with the regulations of the most restrictive states even when the representation 
has no relationship with those states.  For example, the Ohio attorney would only have to 
consider the duties and restrictions imposed by Ohio and Virginia’s ethic rules, not the 
ethics rules of every state.  As long as Ohio and Virginia allowed this type of 
representation, the attorney could engage in this electronic representation despite other 
jurisdictions prohibiting electronic representation.  In this manner, one jurisdiction would 
not control the conduct of actors in electronic representations bearing no relationship at 
all to that jurisdiction, and thus, any concerns about the extraterritorial application of 
states’ ethics laws similar to those expressed in the line of cases invalidating state 
regulation of the Internet under the dormant commerce clause are not relevant in this 
context. 
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B. The Benefits to Potential Jurisdictions of Applying Their Ethical Regimes to 
E-Lawyering 
 
Having analyzed the burden placed on attorneys in ascertaining which 
jurisdictions ethic rules will apply when engaging in electronic representations, it is 
necessary to examine the benefit to the potential states whose ethical regimes could apply 
to any given representation.  In an electronic representation involving an attorney and 
client physically located in different jurisdictions, the ethics laws of both the client’s 
home jurisdiction and the attorney’s home jurisdiction are potentially applicable to the 
attorney’s conduct.  The current version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) applies the ethics laws 
“of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred” to an attorney unless “the 
predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction.”257 A court would most 
likely find that the lawyer’s conduct occurred or the predominant effect of the conduct in 
an electronic representation was felt in either the client’s home jurisdiction, where the 
attorney concerned presumably is not licensed, or the attorney’s home jurisdiction, where 
the attorney presumably is licensed.  In the hypothetical being used, the ethics rules of 
Ohio, where the attorney’s office is located, and the ethics rules of Virginia, where the 
client resides, are potentially applicable to the electronic representation concerned.  
A dormant commerce clause analysis requires measuring the benefit to each of 
these jurisdictions of applying its ethics law to electronic legal representations to 
determine whether the benefit exceeds the burden placed on interstate commerce.  
However, to determine the benefit to each jurisdiction, the actual interest of each 
jurisdiction in regulating electronic representations first must be examined. 
 
257 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002). 
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1. Interest of Jurisdiction Where Client Resides in Regulating Electronic 
Representations  
 
In an attorney’s electronic representation of a client, the jurisdiction where the 
client is located, or the client’s home jurisdiction, has a legitimate consumer protection 
interest in applying its ethics rules to this activity in most situations.  Therefore, in the 
hypothetical presented above, Virginia has a legitimate interest in regulating this situation 
because the consequences of the representation ultimately was felt in Virginia.  Virginia 
was where the client acted upon the attorney’s legal advice provided and experienced the 
end result of that advice.   
The first ethical question in the electronic representation concerned would be 
whether the Ohio attorney has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  The purpose 
of unauthorized practice regulations is consumer protection, more specifically to protect 
state residents from representation in legal matters by people who have not satisfied the 
various licensing requirements ensuring that a person will provide competent and ethical 
legal representation to individuals.258 In other words, Virginia’s unauthorized practice 
 
258 See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (“We recognize that the States have a 
compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to 
protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for 
licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.”); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5 
cmt. 2 (2002) (“[L]imiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of 
legal services by unqualified persons.”); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 4, cmt. b 
(2000) (“The primary justification given for unauthorized practice limitations was that of consumer 
protection—to protect consumers of unauthorized practitioner services against the significant risk of harm 
believed to be threatened by the nonlawyer practitioner’s incompetence or lack of ethical constraints.”); 
Ritts, supra note 108, at 24 (“[W]hen foreign lawyers act in a state, outside of court, the state clearly has an 
interest in regulating their conduct, in order to protect such residents of the state as might come into contact 
with them.”).  But see Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 4, cmt. c (2000) (stating that 
“[s]everal jurisdictions recognize that many [out-of-court legal] services can be provided by nonlawyers 
without significant risk of incompetent service” and “that actual experience in several states with extensive 
nonlawyer provision of traditional legal services indicates no significant risk of harm to consumers of such 
services”); Richard L. Abel, United States:  The Contradictions of Professionalism, in 1 Lawyers in 
Society:  The Common Law World 186, 188 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1988) (stating that 
attorneys’ “substantive rules and the disciplinary process have been unresponsive to consumer grievances, 
especially since neither does anything to ensure continuing technical competence among lawyers”); Rhode, 
supra note 16, at 89 (“Three years in law school and passage of a bar exam are neither necessary nor 
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laws provide some measure of protection to Virginia residents from incompetent legal 
representation.  Another ethical issue would be whether or not the attorney had violated 
any rules governing attorneys’ solicitation of potential clients.  Virginia’s legal 
solicitation rules serve a similar consumer protect function of ensuring that attorneys do 
not take advantage of Virginia residents through the manner in which they contact 
potential clients or in the representations that they make to prospective clients.259 
Whether a jurisdiction determines that an attorney can provide competent and 
diligent representation to its residents, including whether the attorney can adequately 
communicate with the client and implement procedures to avoid conflicts of interest, in 
an electronic context would inform the unauthorized practice decision.  For example, it is 
appropriate for Virginia, where the mother resided, to weigh the benefits of allowing 
attorneys located outside of, and presumably not licensed in, Virginia to provide legal 
advice to Virginia residents through Internet bulletin boards or e-mail communications.  
In the hypothetical presented above, the mother initially came into contact with the 
attorney when the he posted a reply to the mother’s initial Internet bulletin board post 
 
sufficient to ensure expertise in the areas where nonlawyer services flourish; lay specialists may be better 
able to provide cost-effective services than lawyers who practice in multiple fields.”); Roger C. Cramton, 
Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 531, 571 (1994) (“The current 
law of unauthorized practice goes too far in seeking to protect consumers from competitive services 
provided by nonlawyers.  Consumer groups and ratings can guide consumers in choosing services.  
Malpractice liability is likely to provide greater protection than professional controls applied to lawyers.”).  
259See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620-21, 624-25 (1995) (recognizing that states “have 
a substantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved 
ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers” while examining Florida regulations that created “a 
brief 30-day black-out period after an accident during which lawyers may not, directly or indirectly, single 
out accident victims or their relatives in order to solicit their business,”  ); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
R. 7.1 (2002) (prohibiting attorneys from making a “false or misleading communication about the lawyer or 
the lawyer’s services”); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.1 cmt. 3 (2002) (noting that “an advertisement 
that truthfully reports a lawyer’s achievements on behalf of clients or former clients may be misleading if 
presented so as to lead a reasonable person to form an unjustified expectation that the same results could be 
obtained for other clients in similar matters without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances 
of each client’s case”); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.3 cmt. 5 (2002) (recognizing that even written 
forms of solicitation, which are permitted under the Model Rules, “can be abused” and cannot be “false of 
misleading” or involve “coercion, duress or harassment” as defined under Model Rules 7.1 and 7.3(b)(2)). 
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about the apartment complex turning down her application due to the size of her family.  
The mother learned some beneficial information through the attorney’s reply post.  She 
learned about the process for initiating a complaint with HUD, and she received a 
preliminary opinion about whether she had a discrimination claim against the apartment 
complex.  This is information that she would not have had absent the communication 
from the attorney.  However, there are some significant ethical issues concerning the 
manner in which the mother received this information.  The attorney provided a legal 
opinion on whether the mother had a valid discrimination claim against the apartment 
complex based on very minimal information from her, with very little opportunity for 
follow up questions, and without being able to make a complete conflicts check. 
States have applied their unauthorized practice laws and solicitation rules to 
analogous situations, often with little to no choice of law analysis, where attorneys 
located and licensed in other jurisdictions attempted through normal United States mail 
communications to procure residents of the regulating state as clients.  In a series of 
recent, related cases, the Indiana Supreme Court applied Indiana’s unauthorized practice 
of law and solicitation rules to attorneys who had sent by United States mail written 
solicitations to survivors of and relatives of people killed in a military plane crash in 
Evansville, Indiana.260 These cases did not analyze explicitly the propriety of applying 
Indiana ethics law to the conduct of attorneys licensed to practice in outside jurisdictions, 
 
260 In re Coale, 775 N.E.2d 1079, 1080-81, 1083-84 (Ind. 2002) (“By their own admission, the respondents 
sent videotapes, personal letters and folders containing information about their law firm and a firm 
brochure to seven people who were widows, widowers or surviving parents of the crash victims or to the 
crash victims themselves.”); In re Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d 719, 720, 721-22 (Ind. 2001) (noting that the 
attorneys “caused to be delivered by United States mail written solicitations to prospective clients in 
connection with the crash”). See also Sterns v. Lundberg, 922 F. Supp. 164, 166 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (stating 
that the attorneys “although not admitted to practice law in Indiana, directed mailings to survivors and the 
families of deceased crash victims in order to solicit potential clients”). 
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but instead discussed the appropriateness of Indiana asserting disciplinary jurisdiction 
over such attorneys.261 
The court, determined that it had disciplinary jurisdiction over the attorneys 
because “any acts” the attorneys took in Indiana constituting the practice of law were 
“subject to [the court’s] exclusive jurisdiction to regulate professional legal activity in 
this state.”262 Moreover, the court emphasized that the attorneys had directed activity that 
had affected Indiana residents: 
By directing the solicitations to the prospective clients, the respondents 
communicated to those persons that they were available to act in a representative 
capacity for them in Indiana courts to address loss or injury associated with the 
plane crash.  As such, they held themselves out to the public as lawyers in this 
state when [none of them were] admitted to practice here.  Those acts constituted 
professional legal activity in this state subject to our regulatory authority.263 
The Indiana Supreme Court then went on to apply Indiana ethics law to the conduct of 
the attorneys concerned without analyzing whether this was appropriate or not.264 
261 See Coale, 775 N.E.2d at 1080-81 (holding that Indiana Supreme Court could properly exercise 
disciplinary jurisdiction over one attorney licensed to practice in the District of Columbia and one attorney 
licensed to practice in California who directed written solicitations by United States mail to airplane crash 
victims); Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d at 720-21 (holding that Indiana Supreme Court could properly exercise 
disciplinary jurisdiction over two attorneys licensed to practice in California who directed written 
solicitations by United States mail to airplane crash victims).  See also Sterns, 922 F. Supp. at 168, 169 
(holding that federal court would abstain from interfering in Indiana disciplinary proceeding when, among 
other things, state court had already ruled on propriety of assertion of disciplinary jurisdiction and 
subjecting “out-of-state lawyers who solicit Indiana citizens to [Indiana’s] disciplinary rules [was] not 
foreclosed by existing case law”). 
262 Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d at 721.  See also Coale, 775 N.E.2d at 1081 (quoting Murgatroyd). 
263 741 N.E.2d at 721 (citation and footnotes omitted).  See also Coale, 775 N.E.2d at 1081 (quoting and 
applying analysis from Murgatroyd to other attorneys not licensed in Indiana that directed solicitations to 
survivors and families of victims of Indiana airplane crash).  A federal court also held that the Indiana 
Disciplinary Commission had a reasonable argument for subjecting the attorneys to Indiana’s disciplinary 
jurisdiction in deciding to abstain from interfering in one of the Indiana disciplinary actions.  Sterns, 922 F. 
Supp. at 169 (“[T]he Court is simply not convinced that the Commission has no chance of subjecting out-
of-state lawyers to Indiana’s disciplinary rules . . . [A]t worst, the Commission’s attempt to subject out-of-
state lawyers who solicit Indiana citizens to this state’s disciplinary rules is not foreclosed by existing 
caselaw [sic] and might even constitute an important case of first impression.”).  Although never explicitly 
stated in any of the decisions, the attorneys apparently directed at least some of their solicitations to Indiana 
residents. 
264 The court explicitly applied Indiana law to Coale and Allen.  Coale, 775 N.E.2d at 1083-84.  Because 
Murgatroyd and Sterns presented the court with a proposed agreed judgment entered into with the state 
disciplinary commission, the court cited and discussed Indiana ethics law without directly applying it.  
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Presumably, the court felt that the justification for applying Indiana ethics rules to the 
attorneys in this situation was so apparent and inherent in its powers as to not require any 
discussion beyond that provided in deciding whether disciplinary jurisdiction was 
appropriate.265 The same policy justification exists for applying the ethics law of the 
jurisdiction where the client resides whether the attorney communications concerned 
occur through regular U.S. mail, by telephone or through the Internet.  The jurisdiction 
has an interest in protecting consumers of legal services that reside in that jurisdiction in 
each of these contexts. 
In the hypothetical situation discussed above, should Virginia decide to allow the 
electronic representation, the next step involves determining if the attorney should use 
any special precautions or procedures during the representation.  It is appropriate for 
Virginia, where the client resides, to determine how best to protect its residents in such 
representations.  Consumer protection considerations similar to those discussed above 
would inform this decision.  In other words, Virginia should decide what safeguards an 
attorney should employ to deal with the advertising, solicitation, confidentiality and 
conflicts issues,266 among other things, that arise in electronic representations of Virginia 
residents because the client experiences the benefits of or harm from the representation in 
Virginia. 
 
Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d at 721-22 nn.3-8, 722.  See also Ill. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Conduct, 
Advisory Op. 94-02 (1994) (applying Illinois unauthorized practice of law statute to attorney licensed “only 
in a state other than Illinois” who mailed “packets of material advertising his law firm’s personal injury 
litigation services, with letters of solicitation, to persons who were injured in major disasters in Illinois”). 
265 Such a view effectively would fold the choice of law analysis into the decision on disciplinary 
jurisdiction.  This might have arisen from the fact that at the time of these decisions Indiana had only 
incorporated the original version of Model Rule 8.5, which did not contain a choice of law provision, into 
its ethics rules.  Ind. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (West 2005) (Historical & Statutory Notes) (setting out 
the language of the version of Rule 8.5 effective from Jan. 1, 1987 to Dec. 31, 2004).  It also is possible 
that the Indiana court simply did not think about the appropriateness of applying its law in this situation.   
266 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (setting out the ethical issues that various jurisdictions 
have recognized electronic representations raise). 
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2. Lack of Interest of Attorney’s Home Jurisdiction in Applying Its Ethics 
Law to an Electronic Representation that Affects a Resident of Another 
State 
 
The attorney’s home state does not have a corresponding consumer interest in 
regulating the electronic representation concerned by applying its ethics law to the 
representation.  Ohio, although it is the attorney’s licensing state, has a negligible interest 
in choosing the best manner of protecting a Virginia resident who the Ohio attorney 
represents “electronically,” whether it be by not allowing such representations or to allow 
such representations if certain safeguards are use.  This is especially the case if Virginia, 
where the client resides, has decided to protect its citizens in a different manner than 
Ohio.  This results because the consequences of the attorney’s actions are experienced by 
a Virginia resident in Virginia.  Virginia is where the mother acted upon the attorney’s 
advice by filing a HUD claim, where the mother is seeking an apartment, and where the 
mother will experience the benefits or harm that results from the manner in which her 
legal problem is resolved.  Therefore, Ohio has very little to no interest in determining by 
applying Ohio law whether the attorney is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law 
by providing legal advice to a person residing in Virginia through the Internet.  Ohio also 
has no interest in determining through its ethics law how Virginia residents are solicited.   
Ohio might assert that it has an interest in regulating the conduct of attorneys it 
licenses no matter where that conduct occurs or is felt in order to protect the purity of its 
bar. 267 In the past, some courts have asserted that the licensing jurisdiction’s interest in 
“purifying” the attorneys it licenses to practice law justifies the application of that 
 
267 The rationale for such extraterritorial application of the licensing jurisdiction’s ethics rules is that the 
licensing state has “an obligation to protect the ‘purity’ of the state’s bar, and that ‘purification’ [requires] 
vigilance against questionable conduct of lawyers, no matter where it [occurs].”  Ritts, supra note 108, at 
27. 
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jurisdiction’s ethics laws to the conduct of such attorneys that occurs outside of the 
borders of the licensing jurisdiction.268 In many of these cases, the courts used this 
“purification” interest to apply a jurisdiction’s legal ethics regime to extraterritorial 
attorney conduct in situations “where other contacts or governmental interests [were] 
entirely absent.”269 
While this purification interest justifies Ohio disciplining an Ohio attorney for 
conduct occurring in the electronic representation of a resident of Virginia, it does not 
justify applying Ohio law to determine whether or not the attorney engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law in Virginia or violated any ethical duty owed to the Virginia 
resident if Ohio’s ethics rules differ from Virginia’s rules in the context concerned.270 
Ohio can protect its interest in ensuring that the attorneys it licenses to practice law 
 
268 See Ritts, supra note 108, at  27, 33-40 (discussing cases asserting that purification of a jurisdiction’s 
bar justified that application of its ethics rules to extraterritorial conduct of lawyers licensed by that 
jurisdiction).  See also, e.g., People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass’n v. Lindsey, 283 P. 539, 546 (Colo. 1929) (“The 
respondent’s oath of office as an attorney and counselor at law is not only binding here in Colorado but 
everywhere. . . It abides with him at all times and places, and he will be held responsible to this court for 
his misconduct as an attorney so long as his name continues on the roll; nor can he put himself in a position 
which will place him beyond the inherent power of this court to purify the bar of its unworthy members, 
and to keep its roster clean.”); Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So.2d 193, 196, 197 (Fla. 1965) (recognizing that 
“to ignore acts of professional misconduct merely because they occurred outside this state would be to 
ignore our duty to protect the people of this state from one who has been held by another state to be unfit” 
and giving collateral estoppel effect to the factual findings of the other state’s judgment but determining 
that “the discipline to be awarded for such acts by this state shall be determined by this court and its 
agencies in the same manner as in all other disciplinary proceedings”); In re Veach, 287 S.W.2d 753, 759 
(Mo. 1956) (“If one has been guilty of conduct inconsistent with the standard expected of lawyers as 
officers of the court, it should make no difference whether the acts were committed on this side or the other 
of a theoretical fence.  There are no territorial boundaries in cases of such misconduct.  The wrong and the 
guilt is within the person himself, and he carries it with him; he cannot be mentally and professionally pure 
in Missouri and impure in Illinois.”).  
269 Ritts, supra note 108, at 55. 
270 See Ritts, supra note 108, at 34-35 (“[I]n the interest of bar ‘purification,’ a court has subject-matter 
jurisdiction to hear any case involving alleged professional misconduct of its attorneys; the bar purification 
interest, however, is not so strong, standing alone, as to justify application of the foreign state’s rule where 
they conflict with the forum’s rules which are more permissive.”).  
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conduct themselves in an ethical manner by asserting disciplinary jurisdiction over the 
attorneys and then applying Virginia’s ethics rules to the conduct in question.271 
Moreover, any interest Ohio has in policing or purifying its bar that supports 
applying Ohio’s ethics rules to the electronic representation concerned, assuming this 
interest exists at all, should give way to the much greater interest of Virginia in protecting 
its citizens from potentially incompetent legal representation, choosing the best manner in 
which to balance its citizens’ access to legal services against the ethical issues posed by 
electronic representations, and deciding how to best minimize the ethical concerns of 
such representations.  Therefore, in dormant commerce clause terms, the putative benefit 
to the attorney’s home jurisdiction in applying its ethic laws to electronic representations 
is negligible at best while the benefit to the client’s home jurisdiction is great. 
C. The Safe Harbor Language of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) Invalidates the Choice of 
Ethics Law Rule Under the Dormant Commerce Clause Because It Allows the 
Ethics Laws of the Attorney’s Home Jurisdiction to Apply to All Electronic 
Representations 
 
The lack of interest of the attorney’s home jurisdiction in applying its ethics laws 
to an electronic representation is problematic under the dormant commerce clause when 
the language of the current version of Model Rule 8.5 is examined.  Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) 
initially applies the ethics “rules of the jurisdiction in which the attorney’s conduct 
occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the 
 
271 See Ritts, supra note 108, at 40 (stating that “‘purification’ alone is not an adequate answer to choice-of-
law questions when they arise, since the purification goal was advanced equally well in both sets of cases 
[where courts asserted disciplinary jurisdiction over attorneys licensed in that state for extraterritorial 
conduct], regardless of whether forum or foreign law was applied”).  See also, e.g., In re Harris-Smith, 871 
A.2d 1183, 1184-85 (D.C. 2005) (applying identical reciprocal discipline to attorney disbarred in another 
jurisdiction for misconduct occurring in the other jurisdiction); In re Barneys, 861 A.2d 1270, 1274-75 
(D.C. 2004) (same).  Furthermore, if ethics rules are recognized as “only an imperfect representation of the 
‘moral purity’ required for the responsible practice of law, then a state’s concern for attorneys’ ‘moral 
purity’ cannot alone justify application of its ethics rules in an extraterritorial manner, at least not where the 
other jurisdiction has meaningful standards of professional conduct to apply.”  Ritts, supra note 108, at 55. 
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rules of that jurisdiction.”272 It is very unclear where an attorney’s conduct “occurs” in 
an electronic representation of a client.  Assuming the attorney and client are located in 
different states, the attorney’s conduct effectively occurs in two jurisdictions:  in the 
attorney’s home jurisdiction where the attorney initiates the Internet communication and 
in the jurisdiction where the client is located and receives the communication.  Therefore, 
equally persuasive arguments can be presented for the attorney’s conduct having 
“occurred” in the attorney’s home jurisdiction as well as in the client’s home jurisdiction 
depending on the point of view used.  Consequently, comparing the interests of the 
jurisdictions concerned according to “where the lawyer’s conduct occurred,” as stated in 
the first part of the test set out in Model Rule 8.5(b)(2), is unhelpful because it is 
impossible to locate a single, discrete jurisdiction where the activity concerned actually 
took place.  
However, examining where the “predominant effect” of an electronic 
representation occurs, as used in the second part of the test used in Model Rule 8.5(b)(2),  
yields a more meaningful comparison of the interests of the potential jurisdictions under a 
dormant commerce clause analysis.  In an attorney’s electronic representation of a client, 
the jurisdiction where the client is located, or the client’s home jurisdiction, has a 
legitimate consumer protection interest in applying its ethics rules to this activity.  For 
example in the hypothetical electronic representation set out above, Virginia has a 
legitimate interest in regulating the representation because the consequences of the 
representation ultimately were felt in Virginia, where the Virginia resident acted upon the 
attorney’s advice.   
 
272 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002). 
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This is why the safe harbor language of the current version of Model Rule 
8.5(b)(2) is problematic under the dormant commerce clause.  This language would not 
subject an attorney to discipline if his or her conduct conformed “to the rules of a 
jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the 
lawyer’s conduct” occurred.273 As explained above, the limited authority available on 
where the “predominant effect” of an attorney’s conduct occurs gives an attorney in 
almost all situations reasonable grounds to argue that the ethics law of his or her home 
jurisdiction apply to electronic representations.  Some of this authority appears to 
consider where the attorney physically drafted documents and conducted research for the 
representation concerned,274 and in almost any electronic representation, this conduct will 
occur in the attorney’s home jurisdiction.   
Certainly, in the hypothetical situation being used, the Ohio attorney would have 
conducted in his Ohio office any research regarding whether the apartment complex 
discriminated against the mother under applicable fair housing laws.  Similarly, the Ohio 
attorney would have drafted in his Ohio office any documents needed in the 
representation.  The case and administrative authority would add to practical arguments 
that the attorney would have that he reasonably believed that Ohio ethics law governed 
the electronic representation of the Virginia resident because Ohio is his licensing 
jurisdiction and the physical location in which he conducted the legal work involved in 
the representation.  Thus, the safe harbor to Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) results in the ethics law 
of the attorney’s home jurisdiction almost always to apply to electronic representations of 
clients.   
 
273 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002). 
274 See supra notes 166, 169–170, 181 and accompanying text. 
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Nevertheless, as established above, the attorney’s home jurisdiction has little to 
no interest in applying its ethics laws to electronic representations and thus derives no 
benefit from regulating this activity in this manner.  Therefore, a choice of law rule that 
results in always applying the ethics law of the attorney’s home jurisdiction to an 
attorney’s conduct in electronic representations fails to meet the minimum threshold 
required under the dormant commerce clause.275 This is because the benefit to this state 
of applying its ethics laws to such representations does not outweigh the burden placed 
on such representations by applying the ethics law of the attorney’s home jurisdiction.    
In fact, always applying the ethics regime of the attorney’s home jurisdiction in 
the context of electronic attorney representations ignores the legitimate interest of the 
client’s jurisdiction, where the consequences of the representation usually are 
experienced, in deciding how to best protect its residents.  Thus, in the hypothetical 
situation, the safe harbor language would allow Ohio law to control the type of legal 
representation that a Virginia resident can use in order to get legal advice regarding an 
incident that occurred in Virginia and in order to take action in Virginia.  This constitutes 
an impermissible burden on this activity.  Consequently, due to the safe harbor language, 
the current version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) violates the dormant commerce clause. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 Accordingly, states should consider adopting the 2002 version of Model Rule 
8.5(b)(2) without the final sentence containing the safe harbor language.  In this manner, 
only the jurisdiction where the largest effect from each representation is experienced 
 
275 See supra note 200 and accompanying text (stating that dormant commerce clause principles determine 
whether the application of a particular state’s laws meets minimum Constitutional thresholds rather than 
determining the one jurisdiction’s law that would be most appropriate to apply in a given situation).  
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would apply its ethics rules to electronic representations.  In many situations, this is going 
to be the jurisdiction where the client physically is located, especially when the client acts 
upon the legal advice obtained through the electronic representation in the client’s home 
jurisdiction.  Presumably, the safe harbor language is intended to protect attorneys from 
facing conflicting obligations under the ethics rules of multiple jurisdictions.  However, 
this language, in conjunction with the limited authority on where the “predominant 
effect” of multijurisdictional representations occurs and practical arguments regarding 
attorneys’ reasonable beliefs about where such effect occurs, results in the application of 
the ethics laws of the attorney’s home jurisdiction to all electronic representations.  
Because the attorney’s home jurisdiction obtains very little benefit from the application 
of its laws in the vast majority of situations, this outcome violates the dormant commerce 
clause.  Three jurisdictions, Florida, Indiana and New Jersey, have already adopted the 
2002 version of Model Rule 8.5 without the final safe harbor sentence.276 
Alternatively, jurisdictions could adopt a choice of ethics rule that applies the 
ethics laws of the client’s jurisdiction to all electronic representations involving residents 
of that state.  A few states have done this, in effect, for all multijurisdiction 
representations involving attorneys not licensed by the state that occur within that state’s 
boundaries.277 This potentially could provide more clarity concerning which 
jurisdiction’s rules would apply to a particular electronic representation.   
 
276 Fla. Bar R. 3-4.6 (effective Jan. 1, 2006);  Ind. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (effective Jan. 1, 2005); 
N.J. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5 (effective Jan. 1, 2004). 
277 Cal. Rules of Ct. R. 967 (effective Nov. 15, 2004) (allowing an attorney licensed and in “good standing” 
in another United States jurisdiction to provide “legal advice in California to a client concerning a 
transaction or other nonlitigation matter” as long as, among other things, the attorney agrees that the 
provision of legal services is subject to California’s rules of professional conduct); Colo. R. Civ. P. 220 
(effective Jan. 1, 2003) (allowing an attorney “licensed to practice law . . . in another jurisdiction in the 
United States” and “in good standing of the bar of all courts and jurisdictions in which he or she is admitted 
to practice” to “practice law in the state of Colorado . . . subject to the Colorado Rules of Professional 
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However, as explained above, it is very difficult to determine exactly where an 
electronic representation “occurs.”  Thus, under the current language of the choice of 
ethics law rules in these jurisdictions, it may still be difficult to determine exactly when 
the ethics rules of a particular jurisdiction apply to an electronic legal representation, 
even under such seemingly “bright line” rules.  Furthermore, depending on the 
circumstances of the particular representation, the representation may have a greater 
relationship with the attorney’s home jurisdiction than the client’s jurisdiction, although a 
court might be able to determine that components of the representation occurred in the 
client’s jurisdiction.  An example of this would be when a client has communicated with 
an attorney over the Internet about a matter governed by the law of the attorney’s home 
jurisdiction and which requires the attorney physically to take some legal action in the 
attorney’s home jurisdiction, such as submitting documents to a court or office located in 
that jurisdiction or engaging in a legal transaction with other parties located in the 
attorney’s home jurisdiction.  In these cases, the attorney’s home jurisdiction would have 
a significant interest in proscribing the ethical limitations of the representation.   
Conversely, adopting the 2002 version of Model Rule 8.5(b) without the safe 
harbor language contained in the last sentence of subsection 2 would still allow some 
flexibility in applying the ethic rules of the jurisdiction with the most significant 
relationship to a particular electronic representation.  However, this rule would avoid the 
unconstitutional application of the legal ethics rules of the attorney’s home jurisdiction to 
 
Conduct”);  Nev. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 189.1 (effective Sept. 24, 2002) (requiring an attorney 
“admitted and in good standing in another jurisdiction in the United States, and who provides legal services 
for a Nevada client in connection with transactional of extra-judicial matters that are pending or 
substantially related to Nevada” to file and annual report, along with a fee, to the State Bar of Nevada and 
to “familiarize himself or herself and comply with the standards of professional conduct required of 
members of the State Bar of Nevada”).    
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electronic representations in which that jurisdiction has very little interest, which will be 
the situation more often than not.  Instead of applying the home jurisdiction’s ethics laws 
when any remotely plausible connection can be drawn between that jurisdiction and the 
representation at issue, which always will be possible in an electronic representation, this 
choice of ethics law rule would allow a court to examine the particular circumstances of 
each electronic representation and apply the ethics rules of the jurisdiction where the 
most significant effect of the representation is felt. 
A third option would be to retain the current safe harbor language but amend 
Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) to include definitions for “conduct occurred” and “predominant 
effect” that focus on the location of the client affected by the legal representation and the 
jurisdiction where the legal advice provided in the representation is acted upon and has 
effect.  These definitions would eliminate any basis for an attorney to argue that the 
“predominant effect” of a legal representation occurred in the jurisdiction where the 
attorney simply drafted legal documents or conducted legal research.  Therefore, by 
either eliminating the safe harbor language currently contained in Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) 
or by precisely defining the key terms “conduct occurred” and “predominant effect,” a 
jurisdiction can align the choice of ethics law determination more closely to the actual 
interests the potential jurisdictions have in and the benefits they receive from applying 
their legal ethics regimes to electronic representations.  
 
